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I. INTRODUCTION
Louisiana law looks favorably upon marriage. When two people
enter into a contract of marriage, this act carries with it not only the
personal and emotional benefits of the public union, but also gives the
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spouses legal rights.' Under Louisiana law, along with the laws of
eight other states, one of the legal benefits of marriage is the creation
of a community property regime between the spouses.2 As a policy, a
regime in which each spouse is the present owner of a one-half
undivided interest in all of the assets between them promotes the
presumption that both spouses contribute equally to the marriage.
Although the Louisiana Civil Code states that marriage is a civil
contract,' because of the intimate nature of the contractual relation-
ship,' the law provides specific rules to govern the relationship above
and beyond general contract law.6 Usually, persons of sufficient
capacity are free to enter into a multitude of contractual relationships
at any given time, but in the marital context, parties cannot contract
1. See, e.g., LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 98 (2010) (stating that spouses owe each other
mutual support, assistance, and fidelity); id. art. 111 (requiring that spouses owe each other
spousal support); id. art. 179 (declaring that children of the spouses are legitimate); id art.
889 (stating that spouses can inherit the other's community property); id. art. 890 (declaring
that spouses are entitled to the surviving spouse usufruct); id. art. 2315.1 (allowing spouses to
bring a survival action); id. art. 2315.2 (allowing spouses to bring a wrongful death action);
id art. 2336 (declaring that marriage creates a community property regime between the
spouses); id art. 2432 (declaring that spouses are entitled to the marital portion).
2. See id. art. 2336. The seven other community property states are Arizona,
California, Idaho, Nevada, New Mexico, Texas, and Washington. Michael J. Vaughn, The
Policy of Community Property and Inter-Spousal Tmnsactions, 19 BAYLOR L. REv 20, 21
(1967). Alaska is sometimes considered to be a community property state because residents
can choose to opt into the community property regime by contract. ALASKA STAT.
§ 34.77.090 (2010).
3.
The principle which lies at the foundation of the whole system is, that whatever is
acquired by the joint efforts of the husband and wife, shall be their common
property; the theory of law being, that the marriage, in respect to property acquired
during its existence, is a community of which each spouse is a member, equally
contributing by his or her industry to its prosperity, and possessing an equal right to
succeed to the property after its dissolution, in case one survive the other.
RICHARD A. BALLINGER, A TREATISE ON THE PROPERTY RIGHTS OF HUSBAND AND WIFE,
UNDER THE COMMUNITY OR GANANCIAL SYSTEM § 11 (Bancroft-Whitney 1895).
4. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 86.
5. See Robert 0. Homes Jr., Comment, The Putative Marnage Doctine in
Louisiana, 12 Loy. L. REv. 89, 114 (1965) ("Although a person may have any number of
children, he is limited by the law to a single spouse. Something in the nature of marriage, in
the attitude of our culture toward it, or in the customs and conventions arising out of that
attitude, makes the rights of a spouse seem something less than proper when exercised by
more than a single mate.").
6. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1916. As a contract, marriage is generally governed
by Book III, Title IV, entitled "Conventional Obligations or Contracts." Marriage is more
particularly governed by Book I, Title IV of the Civil Code entitled "Husband and Wife." See
id bk. I, tit. IV
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another marriage if they are currently married.! Any such subsequent,
bigamous marriage is deemed void ab Azitio.'
Under general contract law, an absolutely null contract produces
no civil effects.' But despite the legally null nature of the bigamous
marriage, Louisiana Civil Code article 96 provides an exception to the
general rule in the marital context." If the second "putative spouse"
enters into the bigamous marriage in good faith, unaware that the other
party to the marriage contract is already married, then the good faith
putative spouse is entitled to the civil effects of the putative marriage."
But because the bigamous spouse, or "common spouse," is already
contractually married to the "legal spouse," the insertion of a third
person into the preexisting marital relationship disrupts the normal
application of community property rules. 2 Although the Code
provides that both the legal and putative spouses are entitled to a
community property regime, the Code is silent as to how the putative
7. See id. art. 1918; id art. 88.
8. Id. art. 88.
9. Id art. 2033.
10. Id. art. 96.
11. Id.
The classic putative marriage doctrine is substantive, ameliorative or
corrective; it is designed to allow all the civil effects-rights, privileges, and
benefits-which obtain in a legal marriage to flow to parties to a null marriage
who had a good faith belief that their "marriage" was legal and valid.
Christopher L. Blakesley, The Putative Manriage Doctrie, 60 TUL. L. REV. 1, 2 (1985)
(footnote omitted). Not all of the community property jurisdictions that make the putative
marriage exception agree as to which civil effects the putative marriage produces. Some of
these civil effects include the legitimacy of the children of the marriage, the right to alimony,
the right to claim workman's compensation benefits, the right to a share of the community
property, the right to inherit as a spouse in the succession, the right to insurance proceeds as a
widow, and the right to sue for the wrongful death of the other spouse. See CAL. FAM. CODE
§ 2254 (West 2010); see also CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 377.60 (West 2010); Adduddell v. Bd.
of Admin., 87 Cal. Rptr. 268, 271 (Cal. Ct. App. 1970); Cortez v. Fleming, 307 So. 2d 611,
613 (La. 1973); Prince v. Hopson, 89 So. 2d 128 (La. 1956); Succession of Chavis, 29 So. 2d
860, 862 (La. 1947). The absolutely null marriage that produces civil effects is called a
"putative marriage." See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 96. As defined in comment (d) to that
article, "good faith" means that the party has an honest and reasonable belief that there exists
no legal impediment to the marriage. Id art. 96, cmt. d.
12. For purposes of this Article, the spouse who has the prior undissolved marriage is
called the "common spouse"; the first spouse of the common spouse is called the "legal
spouse"-because this person is technically still married to the common spouse; and the
party with whom the common spouse contracts the putative marriage is called the "putative
spouse." The putative marriage exists between the common spouse and the putative spouse.
Because the common spouse in both Patton and IPnce was the husband, this Article always
refers to the common spouse in the masculine and the legal and putative spouses in the
feminine, although this is not, of course, always consistent with reality. Patton v. Cities of
Philadelphia & New Orleans, I La. Ann. 98 (1846); Prince, 89 So. 2d 128.
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community property is to be apportioned upon the termination of the
putative marriage.
Two Louisiana Supreme Court cases, looking to both historical
Spanish and French interpretations on the issue, fill this legislative
lacuna. 3 Because the legal spouse is still married to the common
spouse when the common spouse marries the putative spouse, the
Louisiana Supreme Court recognizes that the legal spouse is entitled to
at least some of the putative community property that accrues between
the common and the putative spouse. 4 Unfortunately, because of the
difficulty inherent in slicing a pie three ways when it is normally
divided in half, the jurisprudential rules on allocation allow for a
compromise between the rights of the three parties involved. But this
compromise prejudices the rights of a good faith putative spouse who
enters the marriage unaware that her spouse is already married and
who is unable to remedy the impediment." In cases in which both the
common and putative spouses are in good faith, the putative spouse is
deprived of a one-quarter interest in her putative community property."
Such a jurisprudential interpretation flies at the teeth of the Civil
Code's mandate that the good faith putative spouse receives all of the
civil effects of her marriage, including a one-half interest in the
putative community property-not less.
Although many scholars have addressed the putative marriage
"problem,"" recently, one scholar has argued that Louisiana should
create a method of terminating the legal community property regime
between the legal spouse and the common spouse by using a "putative
divorce," which would provide a solution to the inequities created by
the current apportionment rules." Although this proposed solution
strikes a delicate balance between all of the rights of the parties
involved, the solution proposed in this Article strives to protect more
fully the rights of the good faith putative spouse and also retains
aspects of the current rule, which continue to further public policy.
13. See Patton, 1 La. Ann. 98; Prnce, 89 So. 2d 128.
14. Patton, 1 La. Ann. at 106; Prince, 89 So. 2d at 132.
15. See Monica Hof Wallace, The Pitfalls of a Putative Marnage and the Call for a
Putative Divorce, 64 LA. L. REv 71, 89 (2003).
16. Pince, 89 So. 2d at 132.
17. See Blakesley, suprd note 11; Robert A. Pascal, Putative Marniage and
Community Property, 17 LA. L. REv. 303 (1957); L. Julian Samuel, The Necessity for the
Continuance of Good Faith in a Putative Marnage, 6 TUL. L. REv. 306 (1932); Wallace, supm
note 15; Fred R. Godwin, Note, Community Property-Distribution of Property Acqwred
During Existence of a Putative Marriage, 17 LA. L. REv. 489 (1957); Joseph Benjamin
Henderson, Comment, The Civil Effects ofa Putative Mariage, 1 Loy. L. REv. 54 (1941).
18. See Wallace, supra note 15, at 105-08.
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This Article argues that Louisiana should instead adopt a
modified form of the common law doctrine of "living separate and
apart" to address the problems created by the current Louisiana law as
to the apportionment of putative community property." Washington,
California, and Arizona-all community property states-use the
doctrine of living separate and apart in the context of classification of
assets.20 Although the standard differs among the three states, the basic
principle is that the spouses can conduct themselves in a manner that
demonstrates that they are not only physically, but also emotionally
living separate and apart, even if the marriage is legally still intact.2 If
so, then all property acquired after the legal spouses exhibit such
sufficient conduct is deemed to be each spouse's separate property.22
This Article argues that the same requisite conduct sufficient to
terminate the community property regime under the common law
doctrine of living separate and apart should be sufficient to terminate
the legal community property regime between the legal spouse and the
common spouse in the context of putative marriage. Such a solution
addresses the problems and inequities caused by the current Louisiana
law while at the same time addressing some of the issues raised by
scholars who argue for putative divorce.
Part II of this Article discusses the historical treatment of
apportionment of putative community property under Spanish, French,
and Louisiana law. Part III discusses the current Louisiana law as to
the apportionment of putative community property among the three
19. "Living separate and apart" for the purposes of this Article does not have the
same definition as "living separate and apart" for purposes of Louisiana Civil Code article
102 in the context of divorce. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 102 (2010). This Article does not
consider the effect of the putative marriage on succession rights. Because a putative marriage
can terminate upon the death of either the common spouse or the putative spouse, often, the
parties to these partition actions are the successors of one of the three spouses' estates. See
Pince, 89 So. 2d 128; Patton, 1 La. Ann. 98. However, this Article focuses only on the rights
as between the legal spouse, the common spouse, and the putative spouse. The court in
Patton stated that the children do not inherit community property acquired by their father
during a second marriage contracted in bad faith. The Louisiana Supreme Court ratified that
holding in dicta in Pince See Pnnce, 89 So. 2d at 134. In Pi}nce, however, the court held
that the children of the good faith common spouse inherited their father's community
property. Id.
20. Washington and California recognize the doctrine in their legislation, while
Arizona recognizes the doctrine only in two exceptional factual cases. CAL. FAM. CODE § 771
(West 2010); WASH. RE. CODE ANN. § 26.16.140 (West 2010); Pendleton v. Brown, 221 P.
213 (Ariz. 1923); In reMarriage of Fong, 589 P2d 1330 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1978). Seegenerdily
WILLIAM A. REPPY, JR. & CYNTHIA A. SAMUEL, COMMUNITY PROPERTY IN THE UNITED STATES
140-52 (6th ed. 2004).
21. SeegenellyREPPY & SAMUEL, supr note 20, at 140-52.
22. Id at 140.
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parties involved-the legal spouse, the common spouse, and the
putative spouse, and discusses the problems and inequities under the
current apportionment scheme. Part IV discusses the putative divorce
solution, which some scholars propose, and argues that although this
proposed solution addresses many of the problems with the current
scheme, more must be done to remedy the inequity done to the good
faith, putative spouse. Part V presents an alternative solution to the
apportionment problem, arguing that Louisiana should look to other
community property jurisdictions that recognize the doctrine of living
separate and apart. Part VI applies the borrowed doctrine of living
separate and apart in the context of apportionment of putative
community property under Louisiana law. Finally, this Article argues
that Louisiana should apply a particularized form of the doctrine in the
context of putative marriage because it is a more tailored and equitable
solution than the current apportionment scheme and enables the courts
to split two pies in half, instead of one pie into three.
II. THE LOUISIANA PUTATIVE COMMUNITY PROPERTY REGIME:
BLENDING SPANISH AND FRENCH LAWS AND POLICIES
Because of the moral and social implications that attach to
marriage, apportionment of putative community property among the
three parties involved has been a contentious issue in both Spanish and
French historical discussions. As Louisiana law borrowed from both
Spanish and French law throughout its jurisprudential development on
the apportionment issue,23 the different policies behind Spanish and
French laws in this context result in a Louisiana apportionment system
that is not always equitable to the innocent parties involved.24
A. Historical Treatment Under Spanish and French Law
Spanish law first recognized the concept of putative marriage in
Las Siete Partidas to legitimize children born of good faith putative
spouses.25 Although the Partidas did not address the status of the
23. See Ryland Percy, Note, Putative Marriages: What Are "Civil Effects"?, 36 LA.
L.REv. 704, 705 (1976).
24. See infra Part II.B-C; see also Wallace, supm note 15, at 89-95. Although the
classic putative marriage doctrine is generally considered to have developed solely in civilian
jurisdictions, in reality, the doctrine actually existed, at least with regard to the issue of
legitimacy of children, in early English common law. Unfortunately, the doctrine was lost in
later English history. Blakesley, supra note 11, at 7-8. Professor Wallace's article greatly
contributed to the research for this Part.
25. LAS SIETE PARTIDAS pt. IV, tit. XIII, law I (Robert I. Burns ed., Samuel Parsons
Scott trans., 2001) ("If between those who are married openly in the face of the church, such
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778 TULANE LA WRE VIEW [Vol. 85:771
putative spouses, it is generally accepted that under Spanish law, a
good faith putative spouse had the right to share in the community
property acquired during the putative marriage.2 6
Spanish law, which is heavily influenced by canon law, sought to
punish the common spouse for his causing the putative spouse to enter
an impediment should exist that the marriage must be annulled on account of it, the children
begotten before it was known that an impediment of this kind existed will be legitimate. This
will also be the case where both parties did not know that such an impediment existed, as well
as where only one of them know it, for the ignorance of one alone renders the children
legitimate. But, if after it had been certainly ascertained that such an impediment existed
between the parties, they should have children, all those born subsequently will not be
legitimate."). The Las Siete Partidas dates from the thirteenth century. See Samuel, supm
note 17, at 307 n.4; Max Radin & Madaline W Nichols, Las Siete Partidas, 20 CALIF. L. REV.
260, 260 (1932). As originally written, the children born of the putative marriage would be
considered legitimate if one of the spouses was in good faith in contracting the putative
marriage. SANcHEz ROMAN, ESTUDIOS DE DERECHO CIVIL bk. V, col. I, at 911 n.1 (2d ed.
1912) (stating that good faith on the part of at least one spouse had to be found at the time of
the procuration of the putative marriage); see also Samuel, supra note 17, at 307. However, if
both spouses became aware of the impediment to their marriage, all children born thereafter
were considered illegitimate. LAS SIETE PARTIDAS, supra, Samuel, supm note 17, at 307.
Currently, Spanish law is much less stringent. The presumption of good faith continues until
a judicial declaration of nullity. Further, even if both parents are in bad faith, civil effects
flow with respect to rights of children. CODE CIVIL [C.C.] art. 69 (Sp.), m THE SPANISH CIVIL
CODE 23 (Clifford S. Walton ed., Walton & Nester Ponce de Leon trans., 1899):
Marriage contracted in good faith produces civil effects, although it may be
declared null and void. When good faith has existed on the part of one of the
consorts alone, it shall produce civil effects only as to this one and the children.
Good faith is presumed, if the contrary is not shown. When bad faith has existed
on the part of both consorts, the marriage shall only produce civil effects in respect
to the children.
26. See Smith v. Smith, 1 Tex. 621, 628 (1846):
The edition of the Partidas that is in common use is very incomplete; and we
are altogether without the compilations of the laws introduced since the adoption of
that code. We find, it is true, some scattered and detached fragments of these laws
in other works, and from two or three commentators we can glean the substance of
such of them as are referred to in these writings, but they are in so condensed a
form, as to frequently present but very vague and unsatisfactory information.
Were all of these laws accessible, some positive regulation would doubtless
be found, which would convert the ignorance of the parent into a shield, covering
with the like protection both the parent and child, and under whose shelter the
rights of both would be alike sustained against all assaults from whatever quarter.
But though the rational inference from the law in the Partidas would lead to the
conclusion that the benign spirit of that provision has been extended also to the
protection of the innocent and honest; yet, we are not left to unaided construction
or to rules of exposition, however just, to sustain this extension of the salutary
provision. In the "El Diccionario de Legislacion," we find the rule above, deduced
from the spirit of the law in Partidas, so fully, precisely and positively laid down by
this eminent writer, that we can have no doubt of its existence as a principle of
Spanish jurisprudence.
See also Henderson, supra note 17, at 58; Samuel, supm note 17, at 307 n.5.
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into the null marriage.27 This rule was based on the principle sounding
in modem day fraud or deceit that "the law favors those who are
deceived against those who deceive them."28 Because the bigamous
husband was viewed as having committed a wrong against the putative
spouse by deceit, the putative wife had a claim in damages against the
separate estate of the husband equal to his share in the putative
community property.2 As a result, because the husband was entitled to
half of the entire community from the date of contracting the legal
marriage until the termination of the putative marriage, the putative
spouse received his half of the putative community." The legal spouse
received the other half."
Under French law, the Code Napoldon recognized the existence
and validity of putative marriage in articles 201 and 202, again
requiring good faith from at least one of the parties to the putative
marriage.32 However, unlike Spanish law, French law did not view the
bad faith common spouse as a type of tortfeasor owing damages to his
deceived putative spouse." No policy existed under French law to
punish the bigamous spouse; rather, French doctrine argued only for
the protection of the putative and legal spouses.34 Thus French law
27. See Patton v. Cities of Philadelphia & New Orleans, 1 La. Ann. 98, 102-06
(1846).
28. Id at 106; Henderson, supra note 17, at 57.
29. Patton, 1 La. Ann. at 106.
30. Id. at 107.
31. Id; see also HARRIET SPILLER DAGGETT, THE COMMUNITY PROPERTY SYSTEM OF
LOUISIANA WITH COMPARATIVE STUDIES 117 (1931).
32. See CODE CIVIL [C. civ.] art. 201 (1972) (Fr.) ("A marriage which has been
declared void draws after it, nevertheless, civil consequences, as well with regard to the
married parties as to their children, where the marriage has been contracted in good faith.");
id. ("Where good faith exists only on the part of one of the married persons, the marriage is
only attended by civil consequences in favor of such persons, and the children of the
marriage."). Unlike Spanish law, French law legitimized the children of the putative
marriage, regardless of the faith status of the parents. See 1 MARCEL PLANIOL, TRAITt
ELtMENTAIRE DE DROT CIVIL no. 1098 (La. State Law Inst. trans., 12th ed. 1939).
33. See Homes, supra note 5, at 121; Margot Mazeau, Note, Marniage-Civil Effects
of Putative Marn7age-Rights of Legal Chil4 31 TUL. L. REV. 551, 553 (1957) (citing 7
AuBRY ET RAU, COURS DE DROIT CIVIL FRANCAIS 72 n. 18 (5th ed. 1913)); Henderson, supm
note 17, at 58-59 n.25 (citing 10 POTHIER, OEUVRES DE POTHIER 408, 408-10 (1821); 1
M.F.A. VAZEILLE, TRAITE DU MARIAGE 465 (1825); 8 C. DEMOLOMBE, COURS DE CODE CIVIL
560 (1846); 1 C.B.M. TOULUER, LE DROIT CIVIL FRANcAIs 547 (4th ed. 1824); 3 J.B.
DELAPORTE, LES PANDECTEs FRANCAISES 344 (1803); 1 PLANIOL, supra note 32, at 393; 1
AMBROISE COLIN ET H. CAPITANT, COURS ELtMENTAIRE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANCAIS 193 (8th
ed. 1934)).
34. Henderson, supra note 17, at 58.
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held that the bigamous husband, regardless of his good or bad faith,
received a share of the putative community property."
Despite the law's settled view regarding the bigamous husband's
rights, much scholarly debate existed concerning how to apportion the
putative spouse's one-half interest in the putative community property.
French legal scholars Denisart, Toullier, and Vazeille argued that the
legal spouse is not entitled to any of the putative community property,
but is entitled to receive only her share of the legal community from
the inception of her legal marriage to the time of contracting the
putative marriage." This argument was based on a "partnership" or
"association" theory of marriage-that marriage is an association
between two persons to share in the financial benefits of their
relationship." The technicality of the legal creation of a community
property regime, which would entitle the legal spouse to some portion
of the putative community property, was a secondary consideration to
the societal view that each spouse contributes equally to the
partnership or association between them. As a result, Denisart,
Toullier, and Vazeille argued that the legal spouse should receive a
one-half interest in the legal community from the date of her legal
marriage to the date of contracting the putative marriage." The
putative spouse should then receive a one-half interest in the putative
community property from the time of contracting the putative
marriage until its termination." Thus, each wife received a one-half
interest in the community property acquired during the time that she
was associated with the bigamous spouse.4
35. Id; 7 AUBRY ET RAu, supm note 33, at 72 n. 18. The French commentators argued,
however, that the bigamous spouse was not entitled to all of the civil effects of the marriage
as the good faith putative spouse. He could not inherit from the putative spouse or the
children of the putative marriage, even though the reverse was possible. 1 PLANIOL, supra
note 32, at 11 10A; I TOULLIER, supra note 33, § 663; 1 vAZEILLE, supra note 33, § 286; 8
DEMOLOMBE, supra note 33, § 372.
36. 3 J.B. DENISART, COLLECTION DE D~CtsioNs NOUVELLES ET DE NOTIoNS
RELATIVES A LA JURISPRUDENCE ACTUELLE 614 (1784); 1 TOULLIER, supm note 33, § 665; 1
VAZEILLE, supra note 33, § 285; see also Henderson, supra note 17, at 64-65; Wallace, supra
note 15, at 80-81.
37. See 3 DENISART, supm note 36, at 614; 1 TOULLIER, supra note 33, § 665; 1
VAZEILLE, supra note 33, § 285; see also Blakesley, supa note 11, at 55-56; Wallace, supra
note 15, at 81.
38. 3 DENISART, supm note 36, at 614; 1 TOULLIER, supia note 33, § 665; 1 VAZEILLE,
supm note 33, § 285.
39. 3 DENISART, supra note 36, at 614; 1 TOULLIER, supra note 33, § 665; 1 VAZEILLE,
supranote 33, § 285.
40. 3 DENISART, supra note 36, at 614; 1 TOULLIER, supra note 33, § 665; 1 VAZEILLE,
supa note 33, § 285; see also Wallace, supra note 15, at 81.
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Demolombe argued, however, that the partnership theory deprives
the good faith putative spouse of all of the effects of a true marital
community.4' He argued instead that each community should be
liquidated successively and separately, apportioning to each spouse
property equal to that which she would be entitled under her own
property regime, instead of an incorporeal one-half interest in the
property acquired during their respective communities.4 2
Aubry and Rau argued that the legal spouse has an interest in the
putative community property, giving more weight to the technical
existence of the legal community property regime during the existence
of the putative marriage.43 These scholars argued that because the legal
marriage continued to exist during the putative marriage, the legal
spouse should receive a portion of the putative community property."
Aubry and Rau then surmised that, because each wife has an equal
claim to the property, the only division that is equitable is to give each
wife a one-quarter interest.45 The French courts eventually followed
Aubry and Rau's theory, holding that the legal spouse received one-
quarter of the putative spouse's one-half of the putative community
property; the putative spouse received the other one-quarter-instead
of the one-half to which she would otherwise be entitled if her
marriage were valid.46
B HistoicalDevelopment ofLouisiana Law
The Louisiana Civil Code of 1825 adopted the language of Code
Napoldon articles 201 and 202 when enacting articles 119 and 120.47
Articles 119 and 120 legitimized the children born of the putative
marriage and entitled the good faith putative spouse to the civil effects
41. 8 DEMOLOMBE, supra note 33, § 337; see alsoWallace, supra note 15, at 81.
42. 8 DEMOLOMBE, supra note 33, § 377; see also Wallace, supm note 15, at 81.
Further, Denisart, Toullier, and Vazeille differed in their opinions of how to allocate the
bigamous spouse's community property to his heirs. Wallace, supra note 15, at 81. Denisart
and Toullier argued that his one-half of the community property should devolve to the
children of each marriage, respectively. 3 DENISART, supra note 36, at 614; 1 TOULLIER, supra
note 33, § 666. Vazeille, however, argued that all the children of the marriages should share
equally in the community property as it existed during both marriages. 1 VAZEtLLE, supra
note 33, § 377.
43. 7 AUBRY ET RAU, supranote 33, at 75-76.
44. Id; see also 1 PLANIOL, supra note 32; see also Wallace, supra note 15, at 82.
45. 7 AUBRY ET RAu, supra note 33, at 75-76; accord 1 PLANIOL, supm note 32, at
11 10A; 3 G. BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE, TRAITE DE DROIT CIVIL 516-19 (3d ed. 1906); M.
PLANIOL ET G. RIPERT, TRArTE PRATIQUE DE DROTT CIVIL FRANCAIS § 329 n.1 (1926).
46. Wallace, supra note 15, at 82.
47. C. cIv. arts. 201-202 (Fr.); PROJET OFTHE CIVIL CODE OF LOUISIANA OF 1825, at 10
(1822); King v. Cancienne, 316 So. 2d 366, 371 (La. 1975).
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of marriage.4 8 Thus even in the earliest formations of the rule, the
language of the statute sought to protect the rights of the good faith
putative spouse. The Civil Code of 1825 was silent, however, as to
how to apportion the putative community property among the three
parties involved.
In 1846, the Louisiana Supreme Court first considered the issue
of apportionment in Patton v Cities ofPhiladelphia & New Orleans.49
In Patton, the decedent, Andrew Morehouse, married Eleonore Hook
without properly ending his first marriage to Abigail Young. "
Although the court found that Andrew was in bad faith when he
contracted the putative marriage, the court highlighted the fact that
Eleonore contracted the marriage in good faith." Because of her good
faith, the court found that she was entitled to all of the rights that a
lawful marriage gives-a community property regime-under articles
119 and 120.52
However, the Patton court was unsure how to apply these articles.
Instead of looking to French law to address how to apportion the
putative community property, the court looked to Spanish law for
guidance as it was the law in force at the time of Andrew's death in
48. C. civ. arts. 201-202 (Fr.).
49. 1 La. Ann. 98 (1846).
50. Id. at 104. The court held that the marriage between Andrew and Eleonore was
valid under the laws of Spain, even though the couple did not solemnize the marriage before
a priest. See id. At the time that Andrew and Eleonore were married, Spanish law controlled
marriage laws. See id. at 102-04; see also Wallace, suple note 15, at 83 n.68. The court
stated, "The marriages of catholics living amongst heretics or infidels, where the exercise of
the catholic religion is not tolerated, though contracted per verba de pnesenti, without the
presence of the pries, are a real sacrament." 1 La. Ann. at 104 (internal quotation marks
omitted). The court further stated:
[T]he civil law of the country approves this manner of contracting marriages.
Necessity deprives the parties of the accidental minister, but they are themselves
the essential ministers, and consequently, in countries where they cannot have the
presence ofthe pnes4 and where the civil law does not imperatively require it, they
are capable of administering the sacrament to each other.
[The] marriage was valid without the solemnization, and Elonore Hook
was his lawful wife as long as she remained in good faith. We will state here that,
had this marriage been contracted in any other manner not expressly authorized by
the King of Spain, we would have come to a different conclusion.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). However, except in exceptional circumstances, if the
couple does not have a marriage ceremony, the court will not recognize a putative marriage.
LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 91 (2010); Succession of Marinoni, 164 So. 797 (La. 1935).




1813. 1 Relying on Spanish law, the court stated that two separate
communities existed-the legal community between the legal wife and
the bigamous husband and the putative community between the
bigamous husband and the putative spouse.54 Because of his bad faith,
however, the husband forfeited his share of both communities." Thus
the legal spouse and the putative spouse, in addition to the one-half
interest in their respective communities, each received an undivided
one-half interest in Andrew's property."
When the Louisiana Civil Code was amended in 1870, the
numbering of articles 119 and 120 changed to articles 117 and 118,
but the language of the articles did not." Despite the fact that the
legislature took the articles verbatim from the Code Napol6on, the
jurisprudential interpretation of these articles under Patton retained the
Spanish-influenced apportionment scheme when the common spouse
died with both a legal and putative spouse." In fact, courts applied this
apportionment rule regardless of the faith status of the common
spouse, as long as the putative spouse was in good faith." For over 100
years after Patton, the courts held:
[W]here a man marries, and afterwards contracts a second marriage
without the first having been dissolved, the community property
acquired during the coexistence of said two marriages belongs
exclusively and in equal shares to said two wives as long as the second
wife is in good faith, i.e., as long as she has no certain knowledge of the
existence of the first marriage, and the bigamous husband has no share
whatever in said property.co
53. Id. at 104-06; Wallace, supra note 15, at 83. Before Prince v Hopson, in
connection with the division of community property when there is a putative marriage, the
Louisiana courts consistently applied the Spanish law in the interpretation of then-articles
117 and 118. Samuel, supra note 17, at 309 n.28 (citing Waterhouse v. Star Land Co., 71 So.
358 (La. 1916); Abston v. Abston, 15 La. Ann. 137 (1860); Hubbell v. Inkstein, 7 La. Ann.
252 (1852)).
54. Patton, 1 La. Ann. at 106.
55. Id
56. Id at 105-06.
57. SeeLA. CIV. CODE ANN. arts. 117-118 (1870).
58. See Hubbell, 7 La. Ann. at 254.
59. See Succession of Fields, 62 So. 2d 495, 499 (La. 1952); Ray v. Knox, 113 So.
814, 814-15 (La. 1927); Waterhouse v. Star Land Co., 71 So. 358, 360 (La. 1916); Jermann v.
Tenneas, 3 So. 229, 230 (La. 1887); Succession of Navarro, 24 La. Ann. 298, 299 (1872);
Abston v. Abston, 15 La. Ann. 137, 139 (1860); Hubbell, 7 La. Ann. at 254.
60. Fields, 62 So. 2d at 499 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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Louisiana jurisprudence considered the faith status of the common
spouse wholly irrelevant in determining whether to deprive him of his
interest in the putative community property."
In 1956, the Louisiana Supreme Court finally made a distinction
in the jurisprudence based on the faith status of the bigamous spouse
in Pnnce v Hopson.62 In Prnce, James Brough and his first wife,
Victoria Albert, were married for twelve years.' However, James lived
with Victoria for only five years and later filed for divorce on the
ground of seven years' separation.' Although James obtained a
preliminary judgment of divorce, he never obtained a final decree.
Clementine Prince, relying upon James' good faith assertion that he
was divorced from his first wife, later married him." Victoria,
believing her first marriage to be over, remarried a man named Elijah
Albert." Clementine and James lived together as husband and wife for
twenty-one years until he died on May 18, 1940.68 Fifteen years after
James' death, Clementine tried to borrow money on property that she
purchased during her putative marriage.69 Victoria, James' first wife,
came forward and asserted her right to one-half of the property."
In order to determine the proper allocation of the putative
community property at issue, the court first noted that because James
was in good faith when he contracted the putative marriage, the Patton
61. "Good faith" for purposes of putative marriage means that the spouse has an
honest and reasonable belief that there exists no legal impediment to a marriage. Whether
good faith exists is a question of fact dependent upon the circumstances of each case. See
LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 96, cmt. d (2010).
62. 89 So. 2d 128 (La. 1956).
63. Id. at 129.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 129-30. Under current Louisiana law, spouses must meet the requirements
of either article 102 or 103 and article 103.1 in order to obtain a valid divorce. See LA. CIv.
CODE ANN. art. 102 (stating that a divorce shall be granted upon motion of a spouse when
either spouse has filed a petition for divorce and upon proof that the spouses have been living
separate and apart for the requisite period under article 103.1 after filing the petition); id art.
103 (stating that a divorce shall be granted on the petition of a spouse upon proof that they
have been living separate and apart continuously for the required period under article 103.1,
that the other spouse has committed adultery, or that the other spouse has committed a felony
and has been sentenced to death or imprisonment at hard labor); id art. 103.1 (declaring that
the requisite time period for articles 102 and 103 is 180 days or 365 days when there are
minor children of the marriage).







line of jurisprudence was inapplicable." Instead, the court looked to
the language of articles 117 and 118 and held that because both James
and Clementine contracted the putative marriage in good faith, both
were entitled to the civil effects of the putative marriage.72 The court
had to look elsewhere, however, to determine how to divide the
putative community property in such a situation-when the bigamous
spouse is in good faith when he contracts the putative marriage."
Not only did the court distinguish this case factually from the
Patton line of cases, but it also treated the putative community regime
between James and his second spouse as an extension of the legal
community regime between James and his legal spouse.74 The court
reasoned that because James and Victoria never legally divorced, their
community property regime continued into the putative community
regime between James and Clementine." The court, for the purposes
of allocation, considered both communities to comprise one,
continuous community that began from the time that James contracted
the legal marriage and ended with James' death-the termination of
the putative marriage." Because of this characterization, the court
found that legally, James' first wife, Victoria, should be entitled to
some of the putative community property.
In order to resolve the issue of allocation, the court looked to
analogous French interpretations. According to French scholars Aubry
and Rau, Baudy-Lacantinerie, Colin and Capitant, and Ripert and
Boulanger, when both parties to a putative marriage are in good faith,
the husband should keep his share of all of the property acquired
during the existence of both the legal and putative marriages." These
scholars argued further that the putative wife has no claim to any
portion of the community acquired during the first marriage, as this
property would be outside of her community, but that because the
71. Id. at 132. The court stated that where a man and woman live together as husband
and wife, as James and Clementine did for twenty-one years, a presumption exists that they
have been validly married and that the marriage, though null, was nevertheless contracted in
good faith. Id. at 130; see also Succession of Verrett, 70 So. 2d 89, 91 (La. 1953); Succession
of Chavis, 29 So. 2d 860, 863 (La. 1947); Succession of Braud, 127 So. 885, 887 (La. 1929).
72. Pince, 89 So. 2d at 130.
73. Id. at 131-33.
74. Id
75. Id at 133.
76. Seeid.; see also Wallace, supra note 15, at 89.
77. Pnoce, 89 So. 2d at 133 (citing 1 AMBROISE COLIN ET HENRI CAPITANT, TRAFE
DE DROIT CIVIL 375 n.623 (1953); 1 RIPERT ET BOULANGER, TRAITt ELEMENTAIRE DE DRorr
CIVIL DE PLANIOL 384 n.1050 (5th ed. 1950); 3 BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE, supra note 45, at 505
nn. 1912-24; 7 AUBRY ET RAU, supra note 33, at 68-71).
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putative wife was in good faith, she is still entitled to her one-half of
the putative community.8 However, the legal wife is also entitled to
some of the putative community property, because, technically, it was
acquired during the existence of her legal marriage.7 ' These scholars
then surmised that, because each wife has an equal claim to the
putative community property, the only division that is equitable as to
the remaining one-half of the putative community property is to give
each wife one-quarter."o The court allocated a one-half interest in the
community property acquired during the existence of the putative
community to James, a one-quarter interest in the putative community
to Abigail, James' first spouse, and a one-quarter interest in the
putative community to Clementine, James' second spouse." Thus, as
to the property involved in the case, the court held that the legal wife
had a one-fourth interest in the property.82
III. CURRENT STATE OF CIVIL EFFECTS OF PUTATIVE MARRIAGE IN
LOUISIANA: WHY No PROTECTION OF THE RIGHTS OF THE
GOOD FAITH PUTATIVE SPOUSE?
Although the Louisiana legislature revised articles 117 and 118 in
1987, replacing them with current article 96, the article does not
proscribe apportionment rules." These two Louisiana Supreme Court
decisions, Patton and Pnace, decided over 160 and 50 years ago,
respectively, continue to govern the apportionment rules as to putative
community property in Louisiana. Unfortunately, the promotion of the
underlying Spanish and French policies through the continued
application of the apportionment rules results in a scheme that is
inequitable toward the good faith putative spouse.
A. Louisiana Civil Code Article 96
In 1987, the Louisiana legislature amended articles 117 and 118,
replacing them with article 96, and, while broadening the scope of the
rule's protection, continued to reinforce the legislature's desire to




81. Id. at 133-34.
82. Id.
83. 1987 La. Acts 2351.
84. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 96 (2010).
786 [Vol. 85:771
2011] COMMUNTTYPROPERTY1NLOUISL4NA
to all cases of null marriages," but provides a special rule when the
cause of the nullity is a prior undissolved marriage." Article 96
provides in pertinent part:
An absolutely null marriage nevertheless produces civil effects in
favor of a party who contracted it in good faith for as long as that party
remains in good faith.
When the cause of the nullity is one party's prior undissolved
marriage, the civil effects continue in favor of the other party, regardless
of whether the latter remains in good faith, until the marriage is
pronounced null or the latter party contracts a valid marriage.
This article changed the scope of former articles 117 and 118 in one
respect. Under articles 117 and 118, the civil effects of a putative
marriage ended as soon as the good faith spouse acquired knowledge
of the impediment to the validity of her marriage." Under current
article 96, however, as long as the putative spouse enters the marriage
in good faith, civil effects continue to flow in her favor even if she
subsequently becomes aware that her husband has an undissolved
marriage.89 This is because the good faith putative spouse is not in a
position to fix the impediment." Conversely, only the bigamous and
legal spouse can properly terminate their legal marriage. The
legislature's broadening of the protection afforded to a good faith
putative spouse reinforces the policy established in the Code of 1825
and recognized by Louisiana courts since 1820 that the good faith
putative spouse should receive the civil effects of her putative
marriage."
B. Ill-Fitting JuisprudentialApportionment Rules
Unfortunately, the underlying Spanish and French policies that
influenced both apportionment schemes do not comport with
Louisiana's version of community property and the legislature's most
85. Id. "A marriage is absolutely null when contracted without a marriage ceremony,
by procuration, or in violation of an impediment." Id. art. 94. The impediments to marriage
are: married persons may not contract another marriage, persons of the same sex may not
contract marriage with each other, and close relatives may not contract marriage with each
other. Id arts. 88-90.
86. Id. art. 96.
87. Id.
88. Id. arts. 117-118 (1825).
89. Id. art. 96 (2010).
90. Id. art. 96, cmt. b; Wallace, supra note 15, at 86.
91. See Blakesley, supra note 11, at 9.
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recent proscription in favor of the rights of a good faith putative
spouse.
1. Patton: Spanish Law Influence Creates Windfall for Legal
Spouse
Under the rule in Patton, when the bigamous spouse is in bad
faith at the time that he contracts the putative marriage, the law
effectively punishes the bigamous spouse by divesting him of all of the
civil effects of his putative marriage.92 The court took this punishment
theory from Spanish law, which viewed the bigamous spouse as a type
of tortfeasor owing damages to his putative spouse for his causing her
to enter into a void marriage.9 This punishment theory of community
property distribution finds approval in Louisiana Civil Code article
96.9 As the law only grants civil effects to parties who contract the
putative marriage in good faith, the law effectively punishes the
bigamous spouse by divesting him of his putative community
property-similar in style to the law's general proscription that no man
should profit from his own wrongdoing."
However, the method of apportionment of the bigamous spouse's
one-half of the putative community property-in which half goes to
the legal spouse and half goes to the putative spouse-could create an
absurd windfall to the legal spouse." By viewing the bad faith
bigamous spouse as a type of tortfeasor who owes restitution to the
injured parties, it becomes evident that-just as with the majority of all
tort causes of action-unless the tortfeasor acts intentionally, recovery
is dependent upon injury." In some egregious factual situations, the
92. Patton v. Cities of Philadelphia & New Orleans, 1 La. Ann. 98, 106 (1846).
93. Id.
94. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 96 (2010).
95. See Ronald M. Dworkin, The Model ofRules, 35 U. Cm. L. REv. 14,23 (1967).
96. See Homes, suprd note 5, at 122 ("[T]o allow the legal wife to participate in the
putative community in that situation would usually work an injustice to the parties in the
putative relationship who have worked together to acquire the property, and at the same time
would constitute a pure gratuity to the legal wife who, although legally united to one of the
parties to the putative relationship, has in no way participated in the very relationship which
is the foundation of the community property theory."); Wallace, supra note 15, at 92-93.
97. For most tortious actions other than intentional torts, such as negligence causes of
action, damage is required for a cause of action.
[A] plaintiff cannot recover damages by proving only that the defendant has
unlawfully violated some duty owing to the plaintiff, leaving the trier of fact to
speculate as to the damages; he must go further and prove the nature and extent of
the damage suffered and that the breach of duty was the legal cause of that damage.
Leaving either of these damage questions to speculation on the part of the trier of
fact will prevent recovery ....
788 [Vol. 85:771
COMMUNTTYPROPERTYBVLOUISL41A 8
legal spouse will suffer an injury sufficient to entitle her to one-half of
his share of the putative community property. If the bigamous spouse
coldheartedly abandons his devoted legal spouse without any attempt
at formal dissolution proceedings and subsequently manages to marry
the putative spouse, it is clear that upon learning of the putative
marriage, the legal spouse might become very distraught and feel
deceived and grievously wronged. Not only has the common spouse
abandoned her, thus depriving her of any future fruits of his labor
without her consent, but also has caused her to become involved in a
bigamous marital arrangement that is repugnant to Louisiana law and
social policy." If the bigamous husband is a bad faith "intentional"
tortfeasor, then he owes damages to the party that he injured.
However, some of the less egregious situations of bad faith that
cause no substantial economic or emotional harm to the legal spouse
should not require the bigamous spouse to make any payment in
restitution. If the bigamous spouse files for divorce from his first wife
but the divorce decree is never finalized, and he realizes that his first
marriage is undissolved but still enters into the putative marriage,
under Patton and article 96, he still does not receive any putative
community property as a bad faith putative spouse." However, if his
first spouse believed that the divorce decree was valid, she should have
no further economic or emotional expectation from her pseudo-
divorc6. Receipt of any of his putative community property upon
termination of his putative marriage would be a surprising financial
bonus to any legal spouse in this latter situation.
Actual Louisiana cases demonstrate the absurdity of this
windfall. In Pnnce, James and Victoria, his legal spouse, were married
for twelve years but only lived together for five.'" In comparison,
James and Clementine, his putative spouse, were married and lived
together for twenty-one years-four times longer than the time he
lived with Victoria.o' If James had been in bad faith, then Victoria
would have received half of twenty-one years' worth of James' putative
community property for a legal marriage that lasted only twelve
Geoffrey Rapp, Note, Reconsidenng Educational Liability- Property-Owners as Ligants,
Constructive Trust as Remedy, 18 YALE L. & POL'Y REY. 463, 467 n.31 (2000) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
98. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 88.
99. Patton v. Cities of Philadelphia & New Orleans, 1 La. Ann. 98 (1846); LA. Civ
CODE ANN. art. 96.




years.'02 Although Louisiana's current apportionment rule promotes
the legislature's policy of punishing the bad faith bigamous spouse for
the supposed injury that his deceit causes, it can create an unwarranted
and, in some instances, egregious windfall to the unsuspecting legal
spouse."'
Although in some outrageous bad faith factual scenarios it may
be permissible to allow the legal spouse to receive half of the
bigamous husband's putative community property as restitution, in less
atrocious instances it makes little sense to give damages to a legal
spouse who suffers no injury from his alleged deceit.
2. Pnce: French Influence Promotes Policies Rejected by the
Louisiana Legislature
Not only can Patton's bad faith apportionment scheme produce
an absurd windfall for the legal spouse, but the good faith
apportionment rule under Prince also results in a scheme that
undermines the policy of article 96 to protect the rights of a good faith
putative spouse.'" Under Pincoe, if the bigamous spouse enters the
putative marriage in good faith, then he is entitled to one-half of the
community property acquired from the beginning of the legal marriage
to the end of the putative marriage, which the court impliedly
characterized as one continuous community. 's In Pnce, the
Louisiana Supreme Court found that because the legal marriage was
technically still in existence during the time of the putative marriage,
the legal spouse was entitled to a portion of the putative community
property.' In recognition of all rights involved, French law held that
splitting the putative spouse's one-half interest in half was the most
equitable solution.' 7 By adopting the French apportionment rule,
Louisiana adopted into its strict statutory framework a rule based on
equity.
With this adoption, however, the Louisiana Supreme Court erred
in establishing a rule based on two premises inapposite to Louisiana's
current putative marriage policies. Under the French doctrine,
irrespective of his faith status, the bigamous husband was always
102. See Patton, 1 La. Ann. at 106.
103. See LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 96.
104. See id.
105. Prince, 89 So. 2d at 133; see also Wallace, supm note 15, at 89-92.




entitled to his share of the putative community property." The French
rule upon which Price was based suggests an implicit gender bias
toward the historically bigamous husband because, under
contemporary familial stereotypes, the husband was the financial
contributor to the "partnership" and was thus entitled to take his half of
the community with him upon its termination.'" This gender-based
crack in the foundation of the French apportionment rule cannot
support the apportionment scheme under Louisiana law. Because
Louisiana, since its first putative marriage rule in the Code of 1825,
has made entitlement to the civil effects of putative marriage
contingent upon faith status, the use of an apportionment rule that is
not based on faith status, but rather on gender bias and familial
stereotypes, perpetuates the gender discrimination still rampant
throughout the Code."' Any standard other than faith status goes
against Louisiana's policy of protecting the rights of the good faith
putative spouse-who may or may not be the greater financial
contributor to the community."'
Not only does modeling the apportionment rule on the French
rule perpetuate gender stereotypes not sanctioned by the language of
article 96, but also the resulting apportionment scheme, which
deprives the good faith putative spouse of half of her putative
community property, implies favoritism toward the legal spouse.
Article 96 states that the good faith putative spouse receives the civil
effects of marriage-not some of them, but impliedly all of them."2
This puts a good-faith putative marriage on par with that of valid
marital status for purposes of community property rights."' This right
108. Henderson, supra note 17, at 58 n.25; AUBRYETRAU, supra note 33, at 72 n.18; 1
VAZEILLE, supra note 33, § 285.
109. See Homes, supra note 5, at 123 ("To thus deprive the husband, who in most
cases has been the one who actually earned or acquired the community property i toto,
would probably be defined by the court as akin to highway robbery.").
110. See, e g., LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 216 (2010) ("A child remains under the
authority of his father and mother until his majority or emancipation. In case of difference
between the parents, the authority of the father prevails."); id. art. 221 ("The father is, during
the marriage, administrator of the estate of his minor children and the mother in case of his
interdiction or absence during said interdiction or absence.").
111. See Homes, supranote 5, at 123-24.
112. LA. CV. CODE ANN. art. 96.
113. See Henderson, supra note 17, at 55; Homes, supra note 5, at 116 ("[A] putative
marriage shall have 'all the effects of a valid marriage.' Certainly this provision was not
intended ... to apply only to 'property rights'-or to any particular class of rights to the
exclusion of others available to legal spouses; the obvious purpose of the putative marriage




should be a one-half undivided interest in the putative community
property, not one-quarter. But despite the law's determination that a
putative spouse be treated as a valid spouse in this regard, the
apportionment scheme favors the legal spouse by taking half of the
putative spouse's community property and giving it to the legal spouse.
Through no fault of her own, the good faith putative spouse receives
half as much as she would if her marriage were valid."' Such a result
knocks the bottom out of the purpose of article 96, which is to give the
good faith putative spouse all of the civil effects of her marriage."'
IV. SCHOLARLY CRITICISM OF LOUISIANA LAW: SUGGESTION FOR
REVISION
In a 2003 article, Professor Monica Hof Wallace argued that
Louisiana should adopt a partition rule that allows a putative divorce in
order to curb the inequitable effects of Louisiana's current
apportionment scheme. "' Although Professor Wallace's solution
addresses many of the inequities created by the current allocation
rules, it does not completely protect the rights of a good faith putative
spouse and perpetuates a method of allocation that promotes a
community property division scheme foreign to the equal distribution
policy under Louisiana community property law. Professor Wallace
sets out alternative putative divorce dates-either the date of filing for
divorce or the date of contracting the putative marriage-which would
end the legal community between the legal spouse and the common
spouse."' She then argues that in some cases in which the common
and legal spouse never attempt divorce, the court should balance three
factors to determine whether and to what extent the legal spouse is
entitled to any putative community property."'
114. Upon termination of the community property regime, each spouse receives one-
half of the net value of the community property between them. See LA. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 9:2801 (2010).
115. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 96 (stating that the civil effects continue in favor of a
party who contracted the putative marriage in good faith).
116. See genedly Wallace, supm note 15, at 105-07. The concept that a putative
divorce is a remedy for putative marriage was first recognized by Professor Robert Pascal in
1957. Pascal, supra note 17, at 305.




A. The Call for a Putative Divorce
1. Termination Date: Putative Divorce
Professor Wallace argues that when spouses file for divorce, it is
safe to assume that they intend to terminate their marriage and, thus,
also intend to terminate the community property regime which exists
between them."' Thus, if a spouse files for divorce but some
impediment makes the divorce invalid, the date of filing suit for
divorce should serve as the date of what she terms a "putative
divorce."'20 The date of filing suit for divorce-the date of the putative
divorce-would end the legal community property regime between the
first wife and the bigamous spouse. Thus, when the bigamous spouse
enters into the putative marriage, this begins the putative community
property regime. 2'
Professor Wallace recognizes, however, that spouses who do not
intend a continuation of a traditional marriage do not always file for
divorce.'22 Spouses may physically separate without beginning any
formal divorce proceedings.'23 Thus, for purposes of terminating the
legal community, Professor Wallace argues that, in this latter scenario,
the putative divorce should occur when the common spouse contracts
the putative marriage with his second wife.'24 The putative community
would begin on that same date as well.'25 Functionally, under Professor
Wallace's solution, the legal community would end when the putative
divorce becomes effective-at the earlier of either the date of the filing
for divorce or the date the putative marriage was contracted.'26
2. Two Separate Communities
By arguing for a putative divorce, Professor Wallace's solution
creates two separate communities, as championed by the French
scholar Demolombe,'27 instead of one continuous community as the
119. Id. at 107.
120. Id. at 107-08.
121. Id.
122. Id at 108-09.
123. Id at 108.
124. Id. at 108-09.
125. Id. at 109.
126. Id at 107. Under Louisiana law, the legal regime terminates by the "death or
judgment of declaration of death of a spouse, declaration of the nullity of the marriage,
judgment of divorce or separation of property, or matrimonial agreement that terminates the
community." LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2356 (2010).
127. 8 DEMOLOMBE, supra note 33, § 377.
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Louisiana courts adopted in Pnce.'28 Thus the legal community
between the common spouse and his first wife should terminate before
the putative marriage begins, and the two communities would not
overlap. Although some scholars argue that property acquired during
the existence of the putative marriage should be divided among the
legal and putative spouses based on who acquired the property,'"
Professor Wallace argues that creating two separate communities in
which each spouse takes from her respective community is the most
equitable solution.'o If the putative spouse has no right to the property
in the legal community, then the legal spouse should have no right to
the property in the putative community."'
3. Equity-Based Factors
Finally, Professor Wallace argues that in situations when the legal
spouses do not attempt a divorce, the courts should look to equity to
determine whether and to what extent the legal spouse should receive
any of the putative community property."' In these situations, she
argues that courts should consider the following three factors: the
contact between the legal and the common spouse, the legal spouse's
understanding of the marital status of the common spouse, and
whether the legal spouse received any benefit or enjoyment from
property in the putative community.'3 1 Courts could then balance these
128. See Wallace, supm note 15, at 89-92. Many scholars have suggested that two,
separate communities can exist. See id. at 105 (citing Blakesley, supra note 11, at 38-39;
Pascal, supra note 17, at 303 ("If bigamy is involved and one of the parties to the invalid
marriage is in good faith, there can be two communities, but not one in which all parties
participate."); Godwin, supm note 17, at 491 ("A concept of two communities is entirely
consistent with the Code articles on community property. A search of the jurisprudence does
not reveal any statement negating this concept of two communities.")).
129. See Pascal, supra note 17, at 303-04 ("[Tjhe community by definition can consist
only of property acquired by either or both these spouses. If property is acquired by a third
person, as in this case the putative wife, it cannot possibly fall into the community between
the legal spouses." (foomote omitted)); Blakesley, supra note 11, at 39.
130. Wallace, supm note 15, at 90 ("A community consists of certain assets and
liabilities of two spouses-not three. The fundamental basis of marriage and the family
recognizes this union between two spouses. Additionally, nothing in the Matrimonial
Regimes Title of the Civil Code suggests that there can be only one community." (footnote
omitted)).
13 1. Id.
132. Id. at 109-10; see also Pascal, supra note 17, at 303-04 (arguing that the court
should resort to equity to determine which property entered which community); Blakesley,
supra note 11, at 39 (arguing that equity would be necessary to divide the property in both
communities).
133. Wallace, supranote 15, at 109-10.
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three factors to determine whether and to what extent the legal spouse
is entitled to any putative community property.'34
In most good faith situations, however, Professor Wallace argues
that the legal spouse may not equitably be entitled to any of the
property in the putative community, as "[flairness dictates that the
parties enjoying and contributing to the community property regime
ultimately take pleasure in its benefits." '" However, in some
situations, particularly those involving the more egregious instances of
bad faith bigamy on the part of the common spouse, the courts should
award the legal spouse a portion of the putative community property.'36
She argues that "it seems equitable that if the legal spouse, believing
that she is married, uses property that she thinks entered her patrimony,
she should be entitled to a share of the property notwithstanding the
putative marriage.""' "Otherwise," she argues, "the putative spouse,
who shares the responsibilities of a conventional marriage-working
together, mutually assuming responsibilities, and enjoying benefits-
should be protected against claims of a spouse who had no
involvement in the putative community"'"
B. Addidonal Considerations Raised by This Putative Divorce
Solution
Although Professor Wallace's proposed solution addresses and
eliminates many of the inequities present under Louisiana's current
apportionment scheme, by tipping the balance of available rights in
favor of one party, her solution necessarily detracts from rights of
others. In an attempt to strike the necessary delicate balance, her
solution also eliminates the long-standing jurisprudential rule
established in Patton and introduces the use of factors that sound in
134. Idat 110.
135. Id at 111; see also id. at 111 n.219 (citing Homes, supra note 5, at 122 (stating
that the concept of community property is dependent on the active participation of two
partners joined in a vital relationship, not the formality of marriage between two partners);
Pascal, supra note 17, at 305 ("Just as it is proper to give parties the benefit of the effect of
marriage if they believe themselves married in certain cases, so too it would seem proper to
withhold the effects of marriage if parties do not believe themselves married so as not to
prejudice either of them as to the legal expectancies normal for the state of life which they
putatively possess.")).
136. Wallace, supra note 15, at 111; accord Homes, supra note 5, at 125 ("[O]nly
where the legal wife has been truly wronged should she be entitled to claim any part of the
community property of the putative marriage.").




equitable distribution-a scheme that differs from Louisiana's equal
distribution scheme.'39
1. Eliminating Patton's Harsh Effects on the Heirs of Bad Faith
Common Spouses Detracts from the Rights of the Legal and
Putative Spouses
Professor Wallace's solution advocates for a repeal of Patton to
the extent that it prejudices the rights of the heirs of a bad faith
bigamous spouse upon his death.'40 In Patton, the Louisiana Supreme
Court held that because Andrew Morehouse was in bad faith when he
contracted his putative marriage to Eleonore Hook, his legal and
putative spouse split his half of all the community property as
compensation for his wrong. 4 ' Although this holding furthered the
Spanish policy of punishing the bigamous spouse and protecting the
innocent wives, in Patton, the bigamous spouse was dead and, thus, his
heirs were unjustly deprived of their father's community property.'42
Professor Wallace argues that, despite the presence of bad faith, the
heirs of a bad faith bigamous spouse should still receive their
bigamous parent's community property.14' But by advocating for the
rights of the heirs, her solution detracts from the rights of the legal and
putative spouses and erodes the strong policy against bigamous
marriages.
Eliminating the Patton rule when the bad faith bigamist dies
before someone raises the nullity still does not protect the rights of the
legal and putative spouses in the cases of extreme bad faith. Although
in some instances the Patton rule creates an unwarranted windfall
toward the legal spouse,'" in other instances, the legal and putative
spouses should split his community property in restitution for his truly
wronging them. Although this rule prejudices the rights of the
innocent heirs of a bad faith common spouse, to do otherwise deprives
the spouses of the "damages" owed them out of the estate of their
139. For a discussion of equal distribution versus equitable distribution, see hifm note
151.
140. Wallace, supa note 15, at 115-16.
141. Patton v. Cities of Philadelphia & New Orleans, 1 La. Ann. 98 (1846); see also
Pascal, supra note 17, at 304 ("Under the long adhered to jurisprudence, which seems
equitable, the property acquired by the common spouse will be made available to satisfy the
community rights of both the putative and legal consorts to the prejudice of the common
spouse.").
142. Patton, 1 La. Ann. at 106.
143. Wallace, supm note 15, at 115-16.
144. See supra Part II.B.1.
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deceased "tortfeasor."'45 Any modification to the Patton rule in this
situation should be only as slight as necessary in order to protect the
rights of the innocent heirs while continuing to promote the law's long-
standing choice to give the legal and putative spouses the common
spouse's property in instances of bad faith. The innocent legal and
putative spouses are no less wronged merely because the common
spouse dies with heirs-heirs which in many instances may also be the
children of the legal or putative spouse.
Further, from a policy standpoint, eliminating the Patton rule
whenever heirs stand in the shoes of the bad faith bigamous spouse
erases the law's distinction between good and bad faith in what is sure
to be a large number of putative marriage cases. Since its adoption in
Patton in 1846, Louisiana courts continue to divest the bad faith
bigamous spouse of his community property and do so even in the
face of innocent heirs.4 6 The policy against bad faith bigamy and the
desire to punish and deter such behavior is strong; completely
overruling Patton, even in situations with sympathetic heirs, erodes at
the force and uniformity in promoting that policy. Any modification to
the Patton rule must be done in a way that more delicately balances the
rights of the heirs and the legal and putative spouses while at the same
time continuing to promote the policy against bad faith bigamy in all
situations.
2. Introducing Factors Which Derogate from Tenets of Equal
Distribution
In addition to using alternative termination dates to establish the
putative divorce between the legal and common spouses, if the legal
and common spouse never attempt a divorce, Professor Wallace argues
for the use of three equitable factors to determine whether and to what
extent the legal spouse is entitled to any putative community property.
However, the use of factors can prejudice the rights of the good faith
putative spouse as none of the factors consider facts within the control
of the good faith putative spouse. Finally, the use of factors sounds in
"equitable distribution," digressing from Louisiana's use of an equal
distribution community property regime.147
145. See supm Part I.B.l.
146. See, e.g., Succession of Fields, 62 So. 2d 495, 499 (La. 1952); Waterhouse v. Star
Land Co., 71 So. 358, 359-60 (La. 1916).
147. See LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9:2801 (2010). For a discussion of equal distribution
versus equitable distribution, see Afalm text accompanying note 151.
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Professor Wallace argues that if the common and legal spouse
never file for divorce, then courts should take into consideration three
factors to determine whether and to what extent the legal spouse
should receive any of the putative community property: the contact
between the legal and common spouse, the legal spouse's under-
standing of the marital status of the common spouse, and whether the
legal spouse received any benefit or enjoyment from property in the
putative community.'48 However, the use of a factor test can create
unjustifiable uncertainty as to the portion that each party involved will
receive. At least under the current rule the courts are bound to some
standard: the legal spouse either gets a one-half interest or a one-
quarter interest in the putative community property, depending on the
faith status of the common spouse.'49 It would take decades for the
courts to develop useful jurisprudence regarding how much of the
putative community property the legal spouse would receive in
different factual scenarios. A good faith putative spouse would have
little to no prior jurisprudence to look to in order to gauge how much
of her own putative community property she will receive at the end of
litigation, making estimated planning almost impossible and certainly
impracticable. Such a result is inequitable to the good faith putative
spouse who may not only have to deal with the shock of learning that
her marriage is invalid and that a legal spouse has a claim to some of
the putative community property, but may also render her unable to
plan a course of action knowing that she will receive at least one-half
or one-fourth of her putative community property.
Not only does the use of multiple factors create uncertainty for
the good faith putative spouse, but the particular factors proffered only
consider the equities between the legal spouse and the common
spouse.'o These factors only allow the good faith putative spouse to
take a passive role in the judicial proceedings, having no say in
whether the legal spouse will receive any of the property to which the
putative spouse would otherwise legally be entitled. Although these
factors could potentially make the blow less harsh to the putative
spouse if the equities dictate that the legal spouse should not receive
any putative community property, they still operate to protect the legal
spouse's rights without regard to the rights of the good faith putative
spouse.
148. Wallace, supra note 15, at 109.
149. See Patton v. Cities of Philadelphia & New Orleans, 1 La. Ann. 98 (1846); Prince
v. Hopson, 89 So. 2d 128 (La. 1956).
150. See Wallace, supra note 15, at 109.
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Finally, the introduction of factors to determine how much the
legal spouse receives of the putative community property sounds in
equitable distribution, rather than equal distribution, of marital
property."' Although some community property jurisdictions use
equitable distribution upon divorce, in which factors and equities are
taken into consideration to determine how much each spouse receives
upon dissolution of the community property regime, Louisiana does
not sanction such a theory.152 Instead, Louisiana uses equal division of
property on divorce, meaning that each spouse is entitled to a one-half
interest in all of the community property that accrues between them
during that union.' The policy underlying equal distribution is the
theory that each spouse contributes equally to the union and, thus, each
is entitled to share equally in the fruits of that union when the
community regime terminates between them.'54
Entitlement to one-half of the community property should not be
diminished or altered based on factors that are extraneous to the actual
union between the spouses. If equities are to be weighed at all, then
they should be weighed in determining when each union between the
spouses begins and ends, not in determining how much of the putative
community property the legal spouse receives. Arguing for a putative
divorce mechanism alone could have provided the requisite certainty
while at the same time staying in line with current Louisiana policies
underlying community property entitlements. But the introduction of
factors eats away at some of the foundational principles of Louisiana's
community property regime.
151. Different community property jurisdictions employ different standards of
apportionment upon termination of the community. Twelve states use equal distribution
either statutorily or with a presumption of equality, which generally means awarding precisely
equal shares of community property with little, if any, judicial discretion to deviate. See ARK.
CODE ANN. § 9-12-315(a)(1) (2010); CAL. FAM. CODE § 2550 (West 2010); IDAHO CODE ANN.
§ 32-712(l)(a) (2010); LA. REv STAT. ANN. § 9:2801 (2010); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-20(c)
(2010); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 767.255 (West 2010); Hatch v. Hatch, 547 P2d 1044 (Ariz. 1976);
Schissel v. Schissel, 292 N.W2d 421, 423 (Iowa 1980) Michelson v. Michelson, 520 P2d 263
(N.M. 1974); Majauskas v. Majauskas, 441 N.Y.S.2d 900, 903 (Sup. Ct. 1981); Paul W v.
Margaret W, 8 Fam. L. Rep. (BNA) 3013, 3014 (Allegheny County Ct. Dec. 1, 1981);
Campbell v. Campbell, 625 S.W2d 41 (Tex. App. 1981). Other jurisdictions employ
equitable distribution, which "allows for significant judicial discretion; equity is the ultimate
standard for any property award." Martha F Davis, Comment, The MaritalHome: Equal or
Equitable Distibution? 50 U. CHI. L. REv. 1089, 1094 (1983).
152. SeeLA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2336 (2010); LA. REv STAT.ANN. § 9:2801.
153. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2336.
154. BALINGER, supra note 3, § 4.
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V. INTENT To TERMINATE THE COMMUNITY: LIVING SEPARATE
AND APART
Louisiana should instead look to the common law doctrine of
living separate and apart in the context of classification of community
property as an alternative means to determine the effectual date of the
termination of the legal community regime."' Under the doctrine of
living separate and apart, actions of one spouse or both spouses that
sufficiently demonstrate that the spouses intend to terminate the
community property regime between them-regardless of legal
termination of the marriage-renders all property acquired after the
conduct in question separate property."' Although the states that use
this doctrine do so in all marriages, this Article argues that Louisiana
should adopt the doctrine only in the context of determining
apportionment of putative community property. Further, this
developed common law doctrine already provides specific rules
regarding how to determine the date on which the regime terminates,
making a borrowing of this doctrine easy for the Louisiana courts to
apply in the putative marriage context.
Only three community property states currently recognize the
doctrine of living separate and apart-Washington, California, and
Arizona."' While all three states are community property jurisdictions,
they are the only three states that recognize that spouses can, by their
physical and emotional separation, in certain circumstances terminate
the community property regime between them and change the
classification of any subsequent property acquired from community to
separate."' Washington and California recognize the doctrine within
155. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 771 (West 2010); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.16.140
(West 2010); Pendleton v. Brown, 221 P. 213 (Ariz. 1923). See generdly REPPY & SAMUEL,
supm note 20, at 140-52. Absent statutory recognition, most community property juris-
dictions hold that separation of the spouses does not alter the community property regime.
The statutory enactments in Washington and California are exceptions to the general rule.
156. See REPPY& SAMUEL, supm note 20, at 140-52.
157. Id.; see CAL. FAM. CODE § 771; WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.16.140; Pendleton v.
Brown, 221 P 213 (Ariz. 1923).
158. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 771 (West 2009); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 26.16.140
(West 2010); Pendleton, 221 P. at 213; id. at 218:
We have then the well-recognized rule, which the courts of all jurisdictions
have followed, that the rights of the husband and wife are affected by the
misconduct of one or the other, and that the remedy for such wrong is not limited
to an action of divorce, nor even to any proceeding in court, but that the courts will,
when justice requires it, take cognizance of the wrong and correct the evil, and that
the injured party may act upon the assumption that courts will do so. No instance
has been cited, and it is safe to say that none exists, where the wife who wrongfully
renounces and repudiates the marital relation is adjudged entitled to the subsequent
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their statutory scheme.'" Arizona recognizes the doctrine only in
exceptional situations.'" This Article argues that Louisiana should
borrow certain principles from the three states' interpretations of living
separate and apart and tailor a set of rules to apply in the context of
apportionment of putative community property."'
A. Washngton: A Historically High Standard
Although Washington's original coverture statute provided that
the earnings and accumulations of a wife while living separate from
her husband were her separate property,'62 in 1948 the Washington
Supreme Court first applied the doctrine of living separate and apart
outside of the coverture context.' In Togliatti v Robertson, the wife
obtained an interlocutory decree of divorce from her first husband but
never obtained a final judgment of divorce.'" However, the spouses
physically separated and never resumed marital relations.' The court
held that because the spouses were living separately and because the
wife had obtained an interlocutory decree of divorce, the spouses were
living separate and apart when the husband purchased four U.S.
gains of the husband. By such repudiation the community is at an end so far as
property subsequently accumulated is concerned.
... Restriction upon the husband's power to convey title without the
signature of the wife, like all other regulations affecting community property, is
based upon the assumption that both husband and wife are fulfilling the duties and
obligations imposed by law and incident to the relationship of husband and wife. It
is not contemplated that if either one wholly fails to perform those duties, and
renounces all obligation and responsibility in connection with the marital relation,
the innocent spouse must sit idle and helpless to the end of life.
See generallyREPPY & SAMUEL, supra note 20, at 140-52.
159. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 771; WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.16.140.
160. See Pendleton, 221 P at 213; In re Marriage of Fong, 589 P.2d 1330 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 1978).
161. Washington and California law explicitly use the phrase "living separate and
apart"; however, Washington also uses the phrase "defunct" in reference to labeling the
marriage after the spouses have begun living separate and apart. See Aetna Life Ins. Co. v.
Boober, 784 P2d 186 (Wash. Ct. App. 1990). Arizona cases use the phrase or a form of the
phrase "will to union" in reference to whether or not the spouses have exhibited sufficient
conduct to evince that they have lost their "will to union." See Fong, 589 P2d at 1335.
Regardless of the terminology, the effect is the same: all subsequent property acquired after
the spouses are deemed to be "living separate and apart," or their marriage is "defunct," or
they have lost the "will to union" becomes the separate property of each spouse.
162. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.16.140 (1869).
163. See Cyril Hill, Early Washington Marital Property Statutes, 14 WASH. L. REV.
118, 118 (1939); see also William Oltman, The hmplied Termination of Community Property
Agreements upon Permanent Separation, 14 U. PUGET SOUND L. REv 53, 55 (1990).
164. 190 P2d 575, 578-79 (Wash. 1948).
165. Id.
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savings bonds.'" As a result, the savings bonds were his separate
property.67
In 1972, Washington amended the coverture statute which now
reads: "When spouses or domestic partners are living separate and
apart, their respective earnings and accumulations shall be the separate
property of each."'"6  Washington courts often use the term "defunct"
to refer to a marriage in which the spouses are living separate and
apart.'6 If the marriage is defunct, then under this statute, all property
acquired thereafter is the separate property of the acquiring spouse,
regardless of whether the actual marriage legally terminates.' Juris-
prudence provides the test to determine whether a marriage is defunct
under Washington law: "[W]hether the parties by their conduct have
exhibited a decision to renounce the community, with no intention of
ever resuming the marital relationship." "' Although physical
separation is necessary to find a defunct marriage, the mere physical
separation of the spouses is insufficient-even if they remain
separated for a long time.'72 In addition to physical separation, the
spouses must, by their conduct, show that they intend to end the
community between them.'
To aid in applying this standard, Washington uses a presumption
of the continued validity of the marriage and community property
regime.' Although it is unclear what burden is necessary to overcome
the presumption, Washington courts rarely depart from Togliattis high
standard-finding marriages defunct only when one or both spouses
live separately and have commenced formal divorce or separation
proceedings or the spouses have signed a separate property
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 26.16.140 (West 2010).
169. See MacKenzie v. Sellner, 361 P.2d 165 (Wash. 1961); Aetna Life Ins. Co. v.
Boober, 784 P.2d 186 (Wash. Ct. App. 1990); In re Estate of Osicka, 461 P2d 585 (Wash. Ct.
App. 1969).
170. Aetna, 784 P2d at 187-88.
171. Oil Heat Co. of Port Angeles, Inc. v. Sweeney, 613 P2d 169, 171 (Wash. Ct. App.
1980).
172. See In re Estate of Nikiporez, 574 P2d 1204, 1211 (Wash. Ct. App. 1978)
(holding that even though the spouses were physically separated for thirty years, the wife
could not prove that the husband intended to end the marriage).
173. Id. The Washington court seems to use the term "end the community"
interchangeably with "create a defunct marriage." Technically, these two phrases address
different issues. Ending the community can occur without ending the marriage. But creating
a defunct marriage speaks to the validity of the marriage, regardless of the effects on the
community. Although a finding of a defunct marriage results in a termination of the




agreement.'" In a surprising relaxation of the rule in 1980, the
Washington court of appeals held in Peter v Skalman that the
commencement of formal separation or divorce proceedings is not
necessary as long as the conduct of the spouses is sufficient to show
that the marriage is defunct."' But despite the recent relaxation of the
rule, appeals courts seem hesitant to stray from Togliatt/s high burden
requirement, absent unusual circumstances.' In Aetna Life Insurance
Co. v Boober, a Washington court of appeals held that evidence that
the spouses physically lived apart for several years, that both had
relationships with other people during the separation, and that the wife
175. Id.; accordOltman, supra note 163, at 56; see also MacKenzie v. Sellner, 361 P2d
165, 167-68 (Wash. 1961) (holding that husband's tort was his separate obligation because
the court found the marriage "defunct" because the wife had signed a voluntary property
settlement agreement, the parties signed a voluntary property settlement, and the parties were
not living together when the accident occurred); In re Estate of Janssen, 351 P.2d 510, 512
(Wash. 1960) (holding that spouses' oral agreement that their property be separate after entry
of interlocutory decree of divorce was sufficient for spouses to be living separate and apart);
In re Armstrong's Estate, 204 P2d 500, 504 (Wash. 1949) (holding that property acquired by
husband after entry of interlocutory divorce decree while spouses living separately deemed
his separate property); Aetna, 784 P.2d at 187-88; In re Estate of Lindsay, 957 P.2d 818, 822-
23 (Wash. Ct. App. 1998) (finding that spouses were living separate and apart after living
apart and signing a separate property agreement); Taylor Distrib. Co. v. Haines, 641 P2d
1204, 1207 (Wash. Ct. App. 1982) (holding that wife's execution of a mortgage after the court
orally granted the final divorce decree but before the final judgment was entered was the
wife's separate obligation because, although not formally divorced, the spouses were living
separate and apart); OilHeat 613 P.2d at 171 (holding that even though the husband did not
support his family between May and August 1977, that he abandoned the family in December
1977, and that the community no longer received any benefit from the husband, this was
insufficient to show that the spouses were living separate and apart); In rv Estate of Osicka,
461 P2d 585, 589 (Wash. Ct. App. 1969) (holding that the marriage was defunct when the
spouses physically lived apart for nine years and signed an agreement releasing the other
from any alimentary obligations).
176. 617 P2d 448,453 (Wash. Ct. App. 1980) (citations omitted):
Although previous cases in which a defunct marriage was found involved a long
separation following entry of an interlocutory divorce decree or execution of a
written separation agreement, we are satisfied that so long as the actions of the
parties evidence an intent to renounce the marriage, no such formal action is
necessary.
Evidence in support of the trial court's conclusion that WC. and Marian's
marriage became defunct in 1943 included proof of their 29-year separation, of the
complete absence of contact between the two, and of statements made by each of
them concerning his or her marital status. The evidence was sufficient to
demonstrate that the separation in 1943 was intended by both to be permanent and
that after such time there was no will to union.
177. See Nuss v. Nuss, 828 P2d 627, 633-34 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992) (citing the Peters
case, but declining to follow it, finding that the spouses were not living separate and apart
because, although they lived separately, no separate agreement was signed nor were divorce
proceedings initiated and the spouses continued social and conjugal contact); Aetna, 784 P2d
at 187-88.
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had a child by another man was still insufficient evidence to rebut the
presumption, because neither spouse commenced any formal
dissolution proceedings."' Even the parties' separate conduct was not
"unusual" enough for the court to overcome the presumption."'
Considering the hesitation shown by Washington appellate courts in
finding that spouses are living separate and apart absent the
commencement of formal dissolution proceedings or a separate
property agreement, these decisions imply that the strongest way in
which a defunct marriage is recognized for purposes of further
classification of property is to demonstrate some attempt toward
formal dissolution.
B. Cahfomia: Subjective Intent Sufficient
Like Washington, California recognized the doctrine of living
separate and apart in its early coverture rules. Former California Civil
Code section 169, enacted in 1869, provided that a woman's earnings
were her separate property if she and her husband were living separate
and apart.' In first interpreting section 169, the California Supreme
Court in Tobin v Galvin in 1874 held, "A temporary absence of the
wife from her husband does not come within the meaning of the Act.
There must have been an abandonment on the part of the husband or
wife, or a separation which was intended to be final."'' For years,
California appellate courts followed this standard, requiring evidence
178. Aetna, 784 P2d at 187-88. This line ofjurisprudence stems from the Washington
Supreme Court's decision in Togliatti v Robertson, in which the court, for the first time, held
that an interlocutory divorce decree and physical separation sufficiently terminated the
community property regime between the spouses, even though the marriage remained intact.
SeeTogliatti v. Robertson, 190 P.2d 575, 578-79 (Wash. 1948).
179. Aetna, 784 P2d at 188-89.
180. CAL. CIV. CODE § 169 (West 1872) (current version at CAL. FAM. CODE § 771
(West 20 10)); see also Carol S. Bruch, The Legal Import ofInformal Marital Separations: A
Survey of Califorma Law and a Call for Change, 65 CALUF. L. REv 1015, 1020-21 (1977)
(footnotes omitted):
Prior to 1971, the law provided that a man's earnings following marriage were
community property unless the parties agreed otherwise or obtained a decree of
legal separation or an interlocutory decree of dissolution. A woman's earnings
were treated differently: although her earnings during marriage were also
community property absent a contrary agreement, no court order was required to
restore their nature as separate property once she and her husband were living
separate and apart. Because few working women received significant pay for their
labors while these statutes were in force, little litigation to challenge a woman's title
to acquisitions following physical separation occurred that might clarify the
definition of "separate and apart."
181. 49 Cal. 34, 36-37 (1874).
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of abandonment or a permanent break in the relationship to deem the
spouses as living separate and apart.'82
In 1889, the California Supreme Court held in Lonng v Stuart
that the husband demonstrated that he and his wife were living
separate and apart at the time that his wife executed a mortgage over
some of what technically was their community property.' The
husband left the home in April of 1883 because of "domestic
infelicity."" The husband testified at trial that he did not intend to
resume intimate marital relations with his wife as of January 1, 1885,
even though he continued to perform his obligation to financially
support his wife after this date.' The husband stated, "I fully
determined in my own mind not to resume intimate marital relations
with my wife again, but I have never ceased, nor do I intend to cease,
performing my obligations to my family . . . ."86 Relying on his
testimony alone, the court held that the spouses were living separate
and apart after that date, and thus the mortgage executed by the wife
was deemed her separate obligation. Under Lonag, physical
separation alone plus a subjective intention never to resume marital
relations as evidenced by self-serving testimony is sufficient to end the
community property regime between the spouses.' Clearly, this is a
far cry from the Washington appellate court holdings, which require
nothing short of the commencement of formal dissolution
proceedings.
Detracting even further from Washington's high standard, in
California it is even possible for spouses to live under the same roof
and still be found to be living separate and apart, as long as at least one
spouse has the subjective intent to end the marriage and there exists
unambiguous, objectively ascertainable conduct amounting to a
182. See Makeig v. United Sec. Bank & Trust Co., 296 P 673, 675 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App.
1931) (providing that section 169 does not apply "to a case where a man and wife are residing
temporarily in different places due to economic or social reasons, but applies to a condition
where the spouses have come to a parting of the ways and have no present intention of
resuming the marital relations and taking up life together under the same roof"); Kerr v. Kerr,
5 Cal. Rptr. 630 (Dist. Ct. App. 1960).
183. 21 P. 651 (Cal. 1889).
184. Id. at 652. Unfortunately, the court did not define what it meant by the phrase
"domestic infelicity."
185. Id.
186. Id. Apparently, the husband made a New Year's resolution that he was not going





physical separation.'" In 1941 in Popescu v Popesc, the California
Court of Appeal for the First Circuit found that the spouses were living
separate and apart even though they still lived in the same house
because the wife refused to speak to her husband, locked herself in
certain rooms of the house, refused to cook his meals, and refused to
perform any duties as a wife."'o More recent appellate court decisions
continue to recognize this application of the rule."'
In 1969, section 169 was amended and renumbered as section
5118, eliminating the coverture rules.' In 1994, section 5118 was
recodified as section 771 in the California Family Code and currently
reads: "The earnings and accumulations of a spouse . . . while living
separate and apart from the other spouse, are the separate property of
the spouse."' But this legislative change did not affect the courts'
application of the standard. In interpreting then-section 5118, the
California Court of Appeal for the Second Circuit found in Patlo v
Nornis that the husband-who the court states drank and walked the
streets at night-pulled out a gun and pointed it at his second wife,
causing her to leave their marital home.94 The court held that this
conduct was sufficient to trigger the application of the doctrine of
living separate and apart, and from the date that the wife left the home
after her husband pulled a gun on her, the property acquired by both
spouses was their separate property.' The court further stated that the
cause of the physical separation was irrelevant.' Although the wife
argued that her leaving should not trigger the doctrine because she left
at gunpoint, the court rejected that argument, stating that "Section
[771] makes no reference to the cause of the separation."'" Such an
189. Popescu v. Popescu, 115 P2d 208 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1941); In re Marriage of
Norviel, 126 Cal. Rptr. 2d 148 (Dist. Ct. App. 2002); see also CAL. CIV. PRAC. FAM. L. LmG.
§ 5:24 (2010).
190. 115 P2d at 208.
191. Norviel, 126 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 148.
192. CAL. CIV. CODE § 5118 (West 1976) (repealed 1992).
193. CAL. FAM. CODE § 771 (West 1976) (repealed 1992).
194. 135 Cal. Rptr. 210, 216 (Dist. Ct. App. 1976). Patillo also has the benefit of
being a putative marriage case as well. Although the bigamous husband was in bad faith
married to two women at a time, the court makes a point to say that he was only with one if
he was "living separate and apart" from the other. Id. at 217. Thus, the court applies the
doctrine to both relationships.
195. Id. at 216. At the time of this decision, California did not have retroactive
reestablishment of the community property regime upon reconciliation of the spouses. See
id Unlike Louisiana law, if the spouses seeking divorce reconcile before the divorce
becomes final, then the court retroactively reestablishes the community property regime
between them. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2375(B) (2010).
196. Patillo, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 216.
197. Id. at 216 n.5; seeCAL. FAM. CODE § 5118 (West 1976).
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interpretation of section 771 is not an anomaly; this broad
interpretation of living separate and apart stems from a long line of
jurisprudence."
C Anzona: An Old PunishmentExcepdon and a Loss of Will To
Union Exception
Until 1973, Arizona Revised Statute § 25-211 read:
All property acquired by either husband or wife during the marriage,
except that which is acquired by gift, devise or descent, or earned by the
wife and her minor children while she lives separate and apart from her
husband, is the community property of the husband and wife. During
coverture, personal property may be disposed of by the husband only.'99
Although such statutes sought to protect the assets of the traditionally
nonearning spouse,20 in Pendleton v Brown, the Arizona Supreme
Court held for the first time in 1923 that, as punishment for her
conduct, a wife can divest herself of any interest in future community
property acquired by her husband while still married.20' In Pendleton,
plaintiff Mary Ellen Brown brought an action against the heirs of her
deceased first husband, Thomas E Brown, claiming a community
interest in land sold to the heirs by Thomas.202 The court, however,
looking to Spanish law and ultimately English common law for
198. See, eg., In re Marriage of Ward, 123 Cal. Rptr. 234 (Dist. Ct. App. 1975); In re
Marriage of Wall, 105 Cal. Rptr. 201 (Dist. Ct. App. 1972); Garfein v. Garfein, 93 Cal. Rptr.
714 (Dist. Ct. App. 1971); Romancheck v. Romancheck, 56 Cal. Rptr. 360 (Dist. Ct. App.
1967).
199. ARIZ. CIV. CODE § 3104 (1901); id. § 3850 (1913); ARiz. REV. CODE § 2172
(1928); Aluz. CODE § 63-301 (1939); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 25-211 to -215 (1973). In
Pendleton v Brown, the court explained the basic principles of coverture:
The fact of abandonment as being found by the jury, raises a question of some
novelty, as well as of great importance to femes covert, whether property acquired
during the time of the desertion can be disposed of by the wife, by will or
otherwise. In other words, is property acquired under such circumstances separate
estate, and as such, subject to her disposition? It is conceded, that the control of the
husband over the personal property of the wife, during coverture, is an important
privilege, and well established right, of which he cannot be deprived, but by his
own act or agreement. The acquisitions of the feme covert, inure to the benefit of
the husband, as, when a bond is given to the wife, he may sue alone. A gift or
legacy to the wife, and even the rewards of her personal labour, during coverture,
vest in the husband, and he may release them. As the law imposes the obligation of
maintaining the wife, and also endows her, it is but reasonable, that he should have
the advantages which arise from the relation of marriage.
221 P. 213, 217 (Ariz. 1923) (internal quotation marks omitted).
200. SeeBruch, supm note 180, at 1020 & n.11.
201. 221 P at 213.
202. Id. at 214-15.
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guidance, held that she had no rights to the property.203 Although
Thomas and Mary Ellen were still married when he bought the
property, Mary Ellen had abandoned the marital home and began
cohabiting with another man.2" Looking to analogous common law
cases,205 the court laid out a new rule:
[T]he rights of the husband and wife are affected by the misconduct of
one or the other, and ... the courts will, when justice requires it, take
cognizance of the wrong and correct the evil, and ... the injured party
may act upon the assumption that courts will do so. No instance has
been cited, and it is safe to say that none exists, where the wife who
wrongfully renounces and repudiates the marital relation is adjudged
entitled to the subsequent gains of the husband. By such repudiation
the community is at an end so far as property subsequently accumulated
is concerned."'
The court held that, by her conduct, the wife had terminated the
community property regime between herself and her husband and had
no rights to the property at issue.'07
203. Id. at 215-18. Although the court ultimately decided against applying the Spanish
law governing the issue because it disagreed with its underlying policy, it used other Spanish
law policies to support its ultimate holding, as taken from the English common law. Spanish
customary law, upon which Arizona community property law is modeled, premised
community property regimes on the "mutual loyalty, the mutual sharing of the burdens of
marriage, the joint industry and labor of the spouses to further and advance the success and
well-being of the marriage and of the family." WILLIAM Q. DE FUNIAK & MICHAEL .
VAUGHN, PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY § 57 (2d ed. 1971); see also Michael
McAuley, The Wanting of Community Property, 20 TUL. EUR. & Civ. L.F 57, 63 (2005).
Based on this underlying policy, Arizona courts use the implied transmutation theory of living
separate and apart to determine whether subsequently acquired property has been
transformed into the separate property of the spouses as a result of their conduct. In re
Marriage of Fong, 589 P2d 1330 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1978); see also REPPY & SAMUEL, supra
note 20, at 150-51. The court stated that "the law of Spain regarded the wife as necessarily a
present and active factor in the community is shown by the fact that when some other than the
lawful wife stood in her place in the household, she was designated as the putative wife, and
as such was entitled to the wife's share of community property." Pendleton, 221 P. at 216.
The court, instead, looked to English common law cases in which abandonment by the
husband would entitle the wife to maintain actions at law otherwise unavailable to her under
the laws of coverture and dower. Id. at 216-18. The court also discussed the Statutes of
Westminister 2, I Edward 13, enacted in the thirteenth century, which provided that adultery
in addition to abandonment uncondoned by the husband operated as a bar to the right of
dower. Id at 216-17.
204. Pendleton, 221 P at 213-15.
205. The court looked to analogous cases decided in other common law jurisdictions.
Id. at 217-18 (citing Gregory v. Paul, 15 Mass. 31 (1818); Starrett v. Wynn, 17 Serg. & Rawle
130 (Pa. 1828); Wheat v. Owens, 15 Tex. 241 (1855)).
206. Id at 218.
2 0 7. Id.
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After Pendleton, however, appellate courts began to back away
from its reasoning, finding Pendleton to be the exception, rather than
the norm.208 In 1973, the law caught up with the courts, and the
Arizona legislature amended the statute.20 This amendment removed
both the living separate and apart language and the coverture rules.210
After this amendment, the statute read: "All property acquired by
either husband or wife during the marriage is the community property
of the husband and wife except for property that is . . . [a]cquired by
gift, devise or descent."2" As this amendment appeared to eliminate
the possibility that parties could, by their conduct, terminate their
community regime by living separate and apart, a bizarre case arose in
which its application was needed in order to resolve property rights of
the interested parties.
In 1978, an Arizona appeals court decided In re Marnage of
Fong.212 In Fong, the husband (Alfonso), was born in China in 1902.213
In 1923, he married Ngan Woon Chow (Ngan) in China, and, because
his father was an American citizen, Alfonso immigrated to Cuba,
leaving his wife to live with his family in China.214 In 1934, Alfonso
returned to China, and, as a result of this visit, Alfonso and Ngan's son,
John Fong, was born in 1936.215 That same year, Alfonso returned to
the United States, eventually settling in Arizona.216 In 1939, he started
a grocery store business in Phoenix.2 7 Alfonso also tried to bring his
208. Appellate courts found that anything short of abandonment would not terminate
the community between the spouses, arguing that the dissolution of the community is
inconsistent with the policy behind legal separation. Rodieck v. Rodieck, 450 P.2d 725, 733
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1969). The Rodieck court argued that if reconciliation can cancel a legal
separation, then it would be inconsistent to allow termination of the community property
upon separation if parties can reconcile. Id. The Rodieck court further argued that the
statute, even if spouses are living separate and apart, retains the vestiges of coverture, in
which the husband still retains management control over community personalty and his
earnings are still community. As the existence of the continuing application of coverture
rules while the spouses were living separate and apart seemed inconsistent with terminating
the regime upon separation, the court argued that it made little sense to terminate the
community property regime upon separation of the spouses. Id
209. Aiz. REv STAT. ANN. § 25-211 (1973).
210. Id
21 1. Id
212. 589 P.2d 1330 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1978).







wife and son to Arizona that year but, because of the state of
international affairs, was unable to do so.218
Seven years later, in 1946, Alfonso was told that his wife, Ngan,
died in China.219 In 1947, Alfonso brought his then-nine-year-old son,
John, to the United States and married Lily Fong.220 Alfonso returned
to China three more times in 1949, 1957, and 1971.221 During the 1957
visit, he was introduced to a woman whom he believed to be his late
wife's sister.222 In reality, it was his first wife, Ngan, in disguise.223
Apparently, she learned that Alfonso had remarried in 1947.224
John, the son of Alfonso and Ngan, grew up in Arizona. In 1968,
John went to Hong Kong where he met and married his wife.225 The
facts are unclear as to how John and his mother met, but the record
states that John's mother, Ngan, lived with John's wife in their home in
Hong Kong until 1972.226 That year, John brought both his wife and
his mother to the United States and told his father for the first time that
his mother was alive and that she was still Alfonso's wife.227
At the time Ngan filed suit, Alfonso had accumulated roughly
$250,000 in real property.28 Because the court found that Alfonso and
Ngan were technically still married, Ngan had a community property
interest in some of the property that Alfonso had accumulated during
his time in the United States. 229 Despite having a presumption of equal
distribution,230 as an equitable distribution state, the court had to decide
whether compelling reasons existed to divide the community property
between Ngan and Alfonso unequally.23'
Despite the recent amendment to Revised Statute § 25-211, the
court did not apply the plain language of the statute and looked instead
218. Id. The court mentions that Alfonso was precluded from bringing Ngan and John
to the United States because of "the war." Undoubtedly, the court refers to World War II.
219. Id. The record states that the trial court found that John believed in good faith that





224. Id The marriage between Alfonso and Lily would be considered a putative





229. Id at 1336.
230. ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 25-318(A) (1980); Hatch v. Hatch, 547 P.2d 1044, 1047
(Ariz. 1976).
231. See Lynch v. Lynch, 791 P.2d 653, 656 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1990).
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to historical precedent. 232 Recognizing Spain's influence on Arizona
community property law, the court stated that under Spanish law, the
spouses must be cohabiting as husband and wife at the time of the
acquisition of the property for the property to be considered
community.23 The justification for this rule was merely an extension
of the policy underlying community property regimes-that the
industry and labor of each spouse while living together should be
mutually shared between them.234 Spanish law did not, however,
require that the spouses live under the same roof, "provided the
marriage subsists, and their mutual consent and union of wills, and no
divorce has intervened."235  The critical inquiry focused not on the
physical location of the two spouses, but upon their subjective intent
and the existence of a continued emotional connection between
them.236
Interpreting the language of the Spanish law literally, the court
held that a clear point existed at which the "mutual will to union
ceased between [Ngan] and [Alfonso]."m2 ' As to Alfonso, the court
held that his will to the union ceased when he believed that his first
232. See ARiz. REv STAT. ANN. § 25-211 (1973) ("All property acquired by either
husband or wife during the marriage, except that which is acquired by gift, devise or descent,
is the community property of the husband and wife."). The court, in a footnote, stated that
"[w]hether this statute is merely a codification of the Spanish community property law and
thus subject to that law's interpretation, or a statutory pronouncement, not subject to
exceptions, we need not decide." Fong, 589 P.2d at 1335 n. 1.
233. Fong, 589 P.2d at 1335 ("'It was a basic principle of the Spanish community
property system that for acquisitions and earnings of the spouses to constitute community, the
spouses must have been cohabiting as husband and wife at the time of the acquisitions or
earnings. This was because it was considered that it was the mutual loyalty, the mutual
sharing of the burdens of marriage, the joint industry and labor of the spouses to further and
advance the success and well-being of the marriage and of the family, which entitled them to
share in the profits."' (quoting FUNIAX & VAUGHN, supra note 203, § 57 n.25)); id. at 1335-36
("'[The conclusion that property acquisitions are community] holds good and applies not
only when the husband and wife cohabit in the same town and house, but even if they are in
different places, provided the marriage subsists, and their mutual consent and union of wills,
and no divorce has intervened, e.g., if the husband is employed, and the wife, because the
climate is hurtful to her health, or for some other just cause remains in her country, or if she
has therein some business, and the husband another business elsewhere; in these and other
similar cases, the marriage, and the partnership and the union of wills subsist, although not
that of their persons, so that all that one or the other or both gain, should be shared and
divided in half; notwithstanding that some say that for this there is necessary the
simultaneous cohabitation; but this opinion is rejected as destitute of a solid foundation."'
(quoting FEBRERO, LIBRERIA DE ESCRIBANOS, CINco Juicios I, bk. I, ch. IV § 1 n.2)).
234. See FUNIAK &VAUGHN, supm note 203, § 57 n.25.
235. Id Some Spanish scholars assert that the parties must live together, but Funiak
and Vaughn propose that such an argument undermines the theory of union of wills. Id.
2 3 6. Id.
237. SeeFong, 589 P.2d at 1336.
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wife was dead and, in good faith, contracted the second marriage with
Lily in 1947.238 As to Ngan, however, the court held that her will to
union ceased when she held herself out to be her sister during
Alfonso's 1957 trip to China.239 While her conduct may have been
keeping in line with Chinese custom at the time, such conduct, the
court held, was inconsistent with the "conjugal partnership" that
establishes the community property regime under Arizona law.240 For
purposes of classification of assets, the court held that all of the
property acquired by Alfonso before his marriage to Lily should be
divided equally between him and Ngan, because at that time, both of
the parties had a will to union.241  However, the court held that all
property acquired after Alfonso married Lily should be awarded to
Alfonso.242
Unlike some of the previous case examples of living separate and
apart, Fongprovides the luxury of also being a putative marriage case,
as Alfonso's second marriage to Lily was bigamous.243 The interplay
between the principles of both putative marriage and living separate
and apart makes this case ripe for borrowing. Fong instructs on four
central points: first, the loss of the will to union must be mutual;
second, whether the conduct is sufficient depends on objective and
customary considerations under state law; third, the critical dates
depend on when such objective conduct occurs; and fourth, in the
context of a putative marriage, the court retroactively terminates the
legal regime to the date when the common spouse contracts the
putative marriage in good faith, not on the later date when the legal
spouse also loses her will to union.
Fong clearly suggests that under Arizona law, unlike in
California, both spouses must lose the will to union in order to
terminate the regime between them.2" The court made it a point to
238. Id Although the court held that the critical date of Alfonso's loss of the will to
union was the date that he married Lily, technically he lost his will at the moment that he
believed his wife to be dead. Id. However, the court, in this author's opinion, used the correct
date because the second marriage may be the only evidence of his loss of the will to union. If
the court held that his critical date was when he learned of his wife's death, such a contention
would be evidentiarily unsupportable.
2 3 9. Id
240. Id The court recognized that, although it may have been customary at the time
for Chinese husbands to marry a second, younger wife, so that the first wife would acquiesce







determine if and when both Alfonso and Ngan lost their wills to
union.245 Thus, one spouse's abandonment of the marital home alone is
insufficient under Arizona law for the spouses to be deemed living
separate and apart.
Additionally, this holding suggests that the court should measure
a spouse's conduct under Arizona laws and customs, not the
individual's own customary marital practices. Although it may have
been acceptable for Ngan to acquiesce in Alfonso's second marriage to
Lily under Chinese custom, the court deemed her secretive conduct to
be incompatible with Arizona's marital policy of a "conjugal
partnership." 246 Disguising oneself as one's sister in order to deceive
the current spouse, the court held, was inconsistent under Arizona law
with demonstrating a continued will to union.247 This approach is more
objective, requiring less of an intrusion into each spouse's subjective
intentions and making the role of the courts more uniform in focusing
on the conduct of the spouses under a single state's customs.
Because the courts must look to objective evidence, the critical
date on which the legal regime terminates should thus be determined
according to objective manifestations, regardless of when the spouses
subjectively lose the will to union. Although the Fong court stated that
Alfonso may have lost his will to union when he first learned that
Ngan was dead, the court looked to the date of his contracting the
putative marriage as objective evidence of his loss.248 With Ngan, the
court stated that even though she heard in 1947 that her husband had
remarried, no objective evidence of her lost will to union occurred
until 1957 when she disguised herself in his presence.249 The court set
the critical termination date based on objective evidence of when both
spouses showed loss of will to the union.
Finally, as Fong is also a putative marriage case, the court had to
fashion a termination date that would not impinge on the existence of
the putative community property regime between Alfonso and Lily. As
Alfonso married Lily believing that Ngan was dead, the evidence
suggests that he entered into his bigamous marriage in good faith.250
Although the opinion does not discuss the putative marriage









regime on the date of his contracting the putative marriage in 1947,
even though Ngan did not lose her will to union until ten years later in
1957.251 Thus, Ngan was denied her community property rights
retroactively to the date that Alfonso first lost his will to union, which
is when he contracted the putative marriage to Lily. The court does not
go into any detail as to why it chose this earlier date, other than that it
was the date upon which Alfonso lost his will to union.252 But this
holding suggests that, at least in the good faith bigamous spouse
scenario, as long as the legal spouse eventually loses her will to union,
the court will retroactively terminate the regime to the date when the
good faith common spouse contracts the putative marriage.253
In the eleven years following Fong, no Arizona opinion discussed
the will to union theory until Lynch v Lynch in 1990.254 In Lynch, the
Arizona Court of Appeals was careful to point out that Fong had not
adopted the will to union theory back into Arizona law, but instead
used the doctrine in that particular case as an equitable justification to
award all of the property acquired by Alfonso after his marriage to Lily
to him:
Fong involved abandonment, assumed death, and a longstanding and
productive putative marriage. It may have been appropriate under such
circumstances to consider that the parties' marriage was an empty shell,
but it would be mischievous to Arizona's statutory scheme to give the
will to union doctrine wider sway. We hold that Fong is limited to its
facts.255
As of 2008, the Arizona Revised Statutes provide that legal separation
does not terminate the community regime unless the separation results
in a divorce, seemingly removing any vestiges of living separate and
apart from its legislation.256 However, as Fong was not overruled by
subsequent cases but merely limited to its facts, the possibility remains
for its application in analogously complex marital arrangements.257
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. In this case, the earlier of the two happened to be the date on which he contracted
his marriage to Lily. If, suppose for example, Ngan relinquished her will to the union before
Alfonso remarried Lily, then this holding suggests that the community property regime
between them would have ceased at the time she held herself out as her sister to Alfonso.
254. 791 P.2d 653 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1990).
255. Id. at 657-58.
256. ARiz.REv. STAT. ANN. § 25-211 (2010).
257. See Lynch, 791 P.2d at 656.
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VI. APPLYING THE DOCTRINE OF LIVING SEPARATE AND APART TO
LOUISIANA'S PUTATIVE MARRIAGE PROBLEM
Considering the cases and principles discussed above, this Article
argues that Louisiana should look to the common law doctrine of
living separate and apart in order to terminate the legal community
property regime within the context of putative marriage. 258 However,
because the interpretation and application of the doctrine differs
among the states that employ it, it is necessary to delineate which
elements of the doctrine Louisiana should apply in order to fashion a
workable solution to the current problems under Louisiana's putative
community property regime.
A. Louisiana & Borrowed Elements and TailoredApplication
Although it is possible to adopt wholly one state's interpretation
of the doctrine of living separate and apart, this Article proposes that
Louisiana should pick certain elements from the above cases in order
to fashion a solution that most closely aligns with its laws and policies.
This proposed solution not only addresses the inequities under the
current law, but also keeps the good faith/bad faith distinction
established in Patton and further breaks down each category. This
results in three factual scenarios in which the common spouse is in bad
faith and two scenarios in which the common spouse is in good faith,
resulting in five total apportionment schemes to which the tailored
doctrine of living separate and apart might apply.
This solution also accepts and advocates Professor Wallace's
argument that Louisiana should eliminate the idea of one continuous
community and instead should look to two nonoverlapping
communities. 259 However, instead of weighing the equities in
determining whether the legal spouse would be entitled to a portion of
the putative community, this solution weighs the equities in
determining when and how the legal community regime terminates
and the putative community regime begins. Further, this solution
attempts to provide the requisite equity and certainty that the current
law does not. In all cases, the good faith putative spouse receives her
one-half of the putative community property, regardless of how the
termination date affects the legal community property between the
258. For a discussion of the problems with the current apportionment scheme in the
context of putative marriage, see supm Part IT.B.
259. Wallace, supra note 15, at 107-09.
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legal wife and the common husband. This principle more fully
protects the rights of the good faith putative spouse.
As this solution requires a piecemeal adoption of certain
principles and holdings from a broad range of principles articulated in
Washington, California, and Arizona, an overview of the pertinent
aspects of each is necessary. First, this solution rejects the high
standard required under Washington law-physical separation and the
commencement of some form of separation or divorce proceedings.260
Of course, conduct rising to that level would certainly suffice;
however, such a high standard should not be required. Instead,
Louisiana should look to conduct akin to that presented in the
California case of Patillo and the Arizona cases of Fong and
Pendleton.26' And for interpretive purposes, these three cases could
present courts with an illustrative list of conduct which would be
sufficient to terminate the community regime within the context of
putative marriage-namely, criminal conduct directed at the other
spouse, such as pointing a gun at a spouse or physically abusing a
spouse;262 conduct inconsistent with the continued will to a union, such
as disguising oneself as another person in order to deceive the
spouse;26 and adulterous activities by one spouse that ultimately cause
the other spouse to lose his or her will to union.26 As these cases
provide merely illustrative examples of sufficient conduct, the
Louisiana courts would have to determine the sufficiency of the
conduct on a case-by-case basis.
Further, under this solution, in order to terminate the community
regime between the legal wife and the common husband, the loss of
the will to union should be mutual. This rejects California's
interpretation, which allows one spouse to end unilaterally and
subjectively the community property regime.265 Instead, Louisiana
should follow the Washington rule and the implied rule in Fong that
mutuality is required to terminate the community.266 This requirement
260. See WASH. REv. CODE § 26.16.141 (2010); see also Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Boober,
784 P.2d 186 (Wash. Ct. App. 1990).
261. 135 Cal. Rptr. 210 (Ct. App. 1976); 589 P2d 1330 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1978); 221 P.
213 (Ariz. 1923).
262. Patillo, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 210.
263. Fong, 589 P.2d at 1333.
264. Pendleton, 221 P. at 213. The author realizes that adultery does not, in every case,
show that spouses have lost a will to union. However, an extended period of adulterous
conduct, as in Pendleton could, perhaps.
265. Loring v. Stuart, 21 P. 651 (Cal. 1889).
266. See Seizer v. Sessions, 940 P.2d 261, 269 (Wash. 1997); In re Marriage of Short,
890 P2d 12, 15 (Wash. 1995); Fong, 589 P2d at 1335; Harry M. Cross, The Commuaity
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not only protects an incompetent spouse who is incapable of
consenting to living separate and apart, but also prevents a bad faith
common spouse from benefiting from his own bad faith breach of that
marital contract by subjectively determining to transform his future
assets into separate property.267
Finally, this solution argues that the nature and sufficiency of the
conduct must be determined using objective considerations. Even if
the common spouse subjectively loses his will to union while he is still
physically living with his legal wife but does not actually leave the
home until sometime later, for example, Louisiana should look to the
first piece of objective evidence in order to determine when each
spouse loses the will to union. In this example, the court would not
deem the husband to lose his will to union until the date upon which he
abandons his legal wife. Such a rule prevents the use of self-serving
testimony and allows for a more uniform application of the law.
What follows are five different putative marriage scenarios in
which the above-tailored doctrine of living separate and apart can
provide the requisite termination date of the legal regime and
allocation rules regarding the putative community property. The first
three scenarios contemplate situations in which the common spouse
contracts the putative marriage in bad faith, while the second two
scenarios contemplate situations in which the common spouse
contracts the putative marriage in good faith.
1. Three Bad Faith Scenarios
If the common spouse is in traditional bad faith when he
contracts the putative marriage, then the doctrine of living separate and
apart can apply in three different manners. Each of the three factual
scenarios has its own termination date and resulting apportionment
scheme, depending on other surrounding circumstances.
Property Law in Washington (Revised 1985), 61 WASH. L. REv. 13, 35 (1986) ("When the
deserted spouse accepts the futility of hope for restoration of a normal relationship, the
marriage should be considered 'defunct' or the separation permanent so that the statute
applies. Finding the statute applicable when the deserted spouse accepts, or perhaps just
acquiesces, in the separation seems to be in philosophical harmony with the dissolution of
marriage act; to dissolve a marriage the act does not require affirmative concurrence in the
other spouse's allegation that the marriage is 'irretrievably broken,' but only that the spouse
does not deny the allegation." (footnotes omitted)).
267. Seizing upon the contractual nature of a marital relationship, the Washington
Supreme Court held in Seizer v Sessions that an incompetent spouse's silence is insufficient
to trigger the doctrine of living separate and apart. 940 P2d at 269. Because of this pseudo
contractual incapacity, Washington courts will not apply the doctrine in situations in which a
spouse is deemed incapable of "consenting" to living separate and apart. Seeid
17
TULANE LA WREVIEW
a. Bad Faith Abandonment by the Common Spouse
In the first bad faith scenario, the common spouse abandons the
legal spouse, physically leaving the marital home. Neither spouse
commences dissolution proceedings, however, and the legal spouse
never loses her will to union and never exhibits any conduct akin to the
illustrative list taken from the cases.268 The common spouse then
marries the putative spouse in bad faith one year later, knowing that his
marriage to his legal spouse is undissolved.269
In this factual scenario, the legal community ends and the
putative community commences when the common spouse contracts
the putative marriage. This termination date applies because the loss
of will to union was not mutual. The legal spouse never lost her will to
union, although the common spouse did, as evinced by his departure
from the marital home. However, unlike the court's holding in Lorng,
his intent alone should not terminate the community property regime
between him and the legal spouse.27 Th1 common spouse could
abandon the legal spouse or manifest a subjective intent to abandon her
immediately thereafter, but may not contract the putative marriage
until a year later. The law should not reward him by allowing all
property acquired in that interim year to be his separate property and,
thus, be excluded from the legal community regime between him and
the legal spouse. During the interim, the legal spouse still has her will
to union, and, in protection of her rights, the law should extend the
legal community property regime until the common spouse contracts
the putative marriage with the putative spouse.
In this factual scenario, upon dissolution of the putative marriage,
Louisiana should use the bad faith partition rule of Patton.271 Upon
dissolution of the putative community regime, the law should
effectively deprive the common spouse of his one-half of the putative
community property regime as punishment for abandoning the legal
spouse and wronging the putative spouse by causing her to contract a
null marriage. The legal spouse gets her one-half of the legal
community, ending on the date upon which the common spouse
contracted the putative marriage, andhalf of the common spouse's half
of the putative community property, beginning on the date upon which
he contracted the putative marriage. The putative spouse gets her one-
268. For the illustrative list, see discussion supra Part VA.
269. For the purposes of these five scenarios, the putative spouse is always considered
to be in good faith when contracting the putative marriage.
270. 21Pat651.
271. For a discussion of the court's decision in Patton, see supra Part III.B.L.
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half of the putative community property and the other one-quarter of
the common spouse's putative community property.
This proposed solution does not divest the common spouse of
one-half of the putative community merely because he is in bad faith,
as under the current Louisiana rule. Instead, this solution divests him
of his portion because the legal spouse still has the will to union, and,
in protection of her rights, the law should enforce the policy as
propounded by the Spanish law and implied in Pendleton by punishing
the common spouse for the wrong done to his first wife.272
Regarding the good faith putative spouse, such a result does her
no inequity because she receives what she would expect to receive had
her marriage to the common spouse been valid-one-half of the
putative community property existing between her and the common
spouse. Further, such an apportionment scheme punishes the common
spouse for abandoning the legal spouse and for causing the putative
spouse to contract an invalid marriage. Policy dictates that the
common spouse should not be allowed to terminate unilaterally the
legal community, nor should this act of abandonment favor him by
terminating the community on the date of abandonment. Even though
such a result seems to create a windfall for the legal spouse-she
receives her one-half of the legal community and his one-half of the
putative community-she should receive such an allocation because
she never wanted the marriage to end, nor even evinced any objective
conduct that she had lost her will to union during the interim year.
b. Bad Faith Abandonment by the Common Spouse and a Loss
of Will To Union by the Legal Spouse
In the second bad faith scenario, the common spouse and the
legal spouse are married, and the common spouse abandons the
marital home. After he abandons the legal spouse, the legal spouse
demonstrates sufficient conduct to prove objectively that she has lost
the will to union as well. Sometime after he abandons the legal
spouse, he marries the putative spouse in bad faith.
In this scenario, the legal community terminates on the date on
which the legal spouse objectively shows her loss of will to union.273
272. See Pendleton v. Brown, 221 P 213, 215 (Ariz. 1923).
273. However, if this factual scenario were reversed, and the legal spouse lost her will
to union before he abandons her and the marital home, then the termination date of the legal
community property regime would be the date on which he abandoned her. Thus, in general,
if both spouses lose their will to union, then Louisiana should terminate their legal
community property regime at the date of the later loss.
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This is because under this solution the mutual loss of will to union is
required for spouses to be considered living separate and apart in the
putative marriage context. Again, as a policy, the law should not allow
one spouse through his conduct to terminate unilaterally the com-
munity regime between him and his first spouse. Upon the
termination of the putative community, the legal spouse gets her one-
half of the legal community from the date upon which the common
spouse and the legal spouse contracted their marriage to the date upon
which both spouses lost their will to union. The putative spouse would
get her one-half of the putative community property that had accrued
between her and the common spouse from the date upon which they
contracted the putative marriage to the date of the termination of the
putative community property regime. If any time period exists
between when the spouses mutually lose their will to union and when
the common spouse contracts the putative marriage, then any property
acquired during that brief period is each spouse's separate property.
Even though the legal spouse is still legally married to the
common spouse at the time that he contracts the putative marriage, if
the law relies on the theory that a community property regime exists
partly as a result of the mutual intent of the spouses to share, then once
that mutual intent is lost, the community property regime should end
as well, even if the marriage is still technically intact. Although the
common spouse is in bad faith when he marries the putative spouse, he
does no harm to the union between him and his first wife by
remarrying because both spouses have lost the will to union anyway.
The law should not punish him in this case by divesting him of all of
his putative community property. Although the court in Patlo would
disagree,274 this seems especially compelling considering the reverse
scenario in which the common spouse abandons the marital home
because of something that the legal spouse did-by living in adultery
as in Pendleton or by threatening the spouse's life as the husband did in
Pa71a275
c. Bad Faith Putative Marriage, but with Formal Dissolution
Proceedings
In the final bad faith scenario, the common spouse and the legal
spouse are legally married. The common spouse files a divorce
petition, but the divorce is never final. The legal spouse, however,
274. Patillo v. Norris, 135 Cal. Rptr. 210, 216 n.5 (Ct. App. 1976).
275. Pendleton, 221 P. at 213; Patillo, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 216.
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never loses her will to union. Sometime after the commencement of
the action for divorce, the common spouse marries the putative spouse
in bad faith.
Under Washington's application of the doctrine of living separate
and apart, in this scenario the community regime between the common
spouse and the legal spouse would terminate when the common
spouse leaves the legal spouse and commences the action for divorce.
However, because the legal spouse does not lose her will to union, the
law should not hold the date of filing for divorce to be the critical
termination date of the legal community property regime. Instead, the
critical date should be the date upon which the common spouse
contracts the putative marriage for the same reasons that it is the
critical date in the first bad faith scenario. Because this solution
requires that loss of the will to union be mutual in order to terminate
the legal community property regime, the regime should not terminate
when the common spouse alone files for divorce.
Although the termination date is the same as in the first bad faith
scenario, the apportionment of the community property is not the
same. Upon termination of the putative community, the legal spouse
should get one-half of the community property accumulating from the
date of contracting her marriage to the common spouse and ending
upon the date of his contracting the putative marriage with the putative
spouse. The putative spouse gets her one-half of the putative
community, and the common spouse gets his one-half of the legal
community and his one-half of the putative community as well.
Although he is technically in bad faith in contracting the putative
marriage, the law should not deprive the common spouse of all of his
putative community property as is argued for in the first bad faith
scenario because, at least in this instance, he took some formal steps
toward dissolution. Further, although the legal spouse still had the will
to union at the time the common spouse filed for divorce, or even at
the time the common spouse contracted the putative marriage, the
service of divorce papers should make her hopes for reconciliation less
objectively reasonable. The date of contracting the putative divorce is
the equitable termination date in this instance because any hope that
the legal spouse may have of reconciliation or continuing her marriage




2. Two Good Faith Scenarios
In contrast to the three bad faith scenarios, below are two factual
scenarios in which the common spouse contracts the putative marriage
in good faith, believing that he was validly divorced from his first wife,
but in which some formal defect plagues the validity of the divorce.
The factual distinction between the two good faith scenarios affects the
resulting termination dates and allocations schemes.
a. The Legal Spouse Loses the Will To Union, Which Causes
the Common Spouse To File Suit for Divorce
In the first good faith scenario, the legal spouse loses her will to
union during her marriage to the common spouse by demonstrating
some objective conduct akin to the conduct in the illustrative list, such
as directing criminal conduct toward him. He then files for divorce.
Unfortunately, a formal defect in the final divorce decree makes the
divorce invalid. However, both he and the legal spouse believe that
they are divorced. Later, he contracts a putative marriage with the
good faith putative spouse.
If this is the case, then the mutual will to union ends when the
common spouse leaves the marital home and files for divorce, as the
cause for his filing was the legal spouse's loss of will to union. Here,
the community between them ends when the common spouse files for
divorce. This is the date at which loss of will to union became mutual.
Upon termination of the putative marriage, the legal spouse gets one-
half of the legal community up to the date of the filing for divorce.
The putative spouse gets her one-half of the putative community
beginning from the date of contracting the putative divorce. The
common spouse gets one-half of the legal community up to the date of
filing for divorce and his one-half of the putative community. If he
acquires property after filing for divorce but before contracting the
putative marriage, then this property would be his separate property.
b. The Legal Spouse Loses the Will To Union After the
Common Spouse Files Suit for Divorce
In the second good faith scenario, the common spouse and the
legal spouse are married. The common spouse files suit for divorce,
but some technicality plagues the validity of the divorce decree. Both
spouses believe the divorce to be valid, even though the legal spouse
does not lose her will to union until sometime after the filing for
divorce. Sometime after he files suit for divorce, the common spouse
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marries the putative spouse. Both he and the putative spouse are in
good faith in contracting the putative marriage.
Although both spouses do not lose the will to union until
sometime after the common spouse files for divorce, because the
common spouse is in good faith, the court should retroactively
terminate the legal community to the date of the filing for divorce.
Mutual loss of will to union is still required as in Fong, however, also
in Fong, the Arizona court found that, although the spouses lost their
will to union at different times, the legal community should retro-
actively terminate at the date the common spouse contracted the
putative marriage, not the much later date on which the legal spouse
disguised herself as her sister in his presence.276 Distinguishing this
from the bad faith scenarios, in which the legal community does not
terminate until the later date on which both spouses lose their will to
union, the more equitable solution in this instance is to terminate the
legal regime at the date of filing for divorce-the date of the earlier
loss of the will to union-because both spouses believe the divorce to
be valid, despite the legal spouse's desires to remain married. This is
especially pronounced in both this hypothetical and in the Fong
situation in which the common spouse remarries in good faith. If the
legal spouse does not lose her will to union until after the putative
marriage, as in Fong, using the later date of the loss of will to union
would highly prejudice the rights of the good faith putative spouse and
would result in a windfall to the legal spouse who believes her divorce
to be valid.
Upon termination of the putative marriage, the legal spouse
would receive one-half of the legal community property between her
and the common spouse. The putative spouse would receive her one-
half of the putative community property between her and the common
spouse. The common spouse would receive his one-half of the legal
community property and his one-half of the putative community
property. Further, any property acquired after the termination of the
legal community property regime but before the date of contracting of
the putative marriage community is each spouse's separate property.
B. The Benefits ofBorrowing the Doctrne ofLivbng Separate and
Apart
These five different termination and allocation schemes address
the problems inherent in Louisiana's current apportionment rules
276. 589 P2d 1330, 1333 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1978).
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within the context of putative marriage. This solution protects the
rights of the good faith putative spouse as contemplated and mandated
by article 96, and in no instance would the legal spouse receive a
windfall at the expense of the putative spouse. This solution also
retains the distinction that the law has developed between good and
bad faith for the more egregious instances of bad faith bigamy and
keeps within the confines of equal distribution, thus creating certainty
and equity as among the three parties involved. However, this solution
has its limitations, especially within the context of the need for
intensive judicial fact finding to meet the standard of proof. But such
setbacks are necessary and manageable by-products of this termination
and apportionment solution.
1. Addressing the Problems in Louisiana's Current Apportionment
Rule
Louisiana Civil Code article 96 mandates that a good faith
putative spouse should receive the full civil effects of her putative
marriage.277 Unfortunately, the Patton and PInce rules that interpret
and apply this article do not fully protect the putative spouse's one-half
interest in the putative community property.27 3 Under the solution
proposed in this Article, however, the good faith putative spouse
always receives one-half of the putative community property. This
solution supports the policy underlying article 96-that civil effects
flow in favor of a spouse who contracts the putative marriage in good
faith. The protection that this solution affords the good faith putative
spouse is clearly demonstrated when considered under the facts of
Prnc 79 James, the common spouse, and Clementine, the putative
spouse, were married for almost four times longer than James and
Abigail, the legal spouse, had lived together.280 However, the court's
solution effectively gave Abigail a one-quarter interest in all of the
putative community property that had been accruing between James
and Clementine for over twenty years. 281 Under this solution,
Clementine would get one-half of the putative community property
277. LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 96 (2010).
278. For a critique of Louisiana's jurisprudential allocation rules, see discussion supm
Part 1.B.
279. 89 So. 2d 128 (La. 1956).




from the time that she and James contracted the putative marriage until
termination of the putative marriage.2 8 2
Finally, this solution does not create a windfall for the legal
spouse in any scenario. The most that the legal spouse could ever
receive is in the case of bad faith abandonment by the common spouse
where the legal spouse has not lost her will to union. In that instance,
she receives her half of the legal community and the common spouse's
one-half of the putative community. Such a windfall is justified
because this allocation punishes the bad faith common spouse for
abandoning his first wife and for deceiving the good faith putative
spouse. In all other situations, the legal spouse can only receive a one-
half interest in the property acquired during the existence of the legal
community regime. The equities are balanced in determining the exact
termination date, thus creating a longer or shorter legal community,
depending on the circumstances.
2. Addressing the Issues Raised by Recently Proposed Solution
The solution proposed in this Article adopts many aspects of
Professor Wallace's proposed "putative divorce" solution. However,
the argument to overrule Patton in cases in which the bad faith
bigamous spouse dies leaving heirs is, in this author's opinion, overly
broad. Under the solution in this Article, the rule in Patton only
applies in the first instance of bad faith-bad faith abandonment on
the part of the common spouse when the legal spouse has not yet lost
her will to union. Only if the bad faith spouse dies leaving heirs does
this situation create inequity toward the common spouse's heirs.
Although the effects of these rules at the death of the common spouse
are admittedly outside the main focus of this Article, perhaps a more
balanced solution would be to award the legal and putative spouses
usufruct over the bad faith common spouse's community property and
the heirs of the common spouse the naked ownership, incorporating all
the applicable rules on governing that relationship already within the
282. Not only does this solution protect a nonworking, good faith putative spouse, but
such a solution is almost necessary to equitably protect a good faith putative spouse who is
the sole breadwinner of the putative marriage. In this instance, fairness and equity most
definitely recognize that the good faith putative spouse should receive her entire one-half
interest in the putative community. This is not to say that a nonworking spouse somehow
does not deserve the full extent of the civil effects of a putative marriage any less than a
working putative spouse-the foundational theory of community property is that both
spouses contribute equally to the marriage. But accumulation of property requires assets-
that is, money-and a spouse's salary is usually the most substantial contribution to the
accumulation of community property.
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Code. Thus, only in the first bad faith abandonment scenario when the
common spouse leaves innocent heirs would this modified Patton rule
apply. Such a slightly narrowed modification of the rule balances the
rights of the legal spouse, putative spouse, and the innocent heirs but
also continues to promote the underlying policy of the Spanish law
from which the current rule derives-to protect the legal and putative
spouses and to punish and deter bad faith common spouses for their
wrongdoing.283
Further, instead of using factors to weigh the equities in each
case, this solution still weighs the equities, but does so only in
determining when the legal community property regime terminates,
not in determining whether and to what extent the legal spouse is
entitled to any putative community property. Once the court sets the
termination date, thus creating two separate communities, the court
should then distribute the community property in each community
equally between the two spouses to each marriage. This solution keeps
within the confines of equal distribution of the two communities upon
termination and weighs the equities in determining when the legal
community ends.
This solution is also more equitable to the good faith putative
spouse and provides certainty as to the portion that she is to receive. In
no instance does the legal spouse ever receive any of the putative
spouse's one-half interest in the putative community. Regardless of
when the court sets the termination date of the legal community
property regime, the putative community regime begins on the date of
contracting the putative marriage and ends upon its termination. The
putative spouse does not have to wait for the court to weigh any factors
to see if the legal spouse should receive any of the putative community
property. The good faith putative spouse always receives her one-half
of the putative community as contemplated by article 96.
C Overcoming the Linitations of this Solution
Despite the fact that this solution addresses the problems and
inequities in the current law, it also has its limitations. Because this
solution argues for a piecemeal adoption of the doctrine of living
separate and apart, incorporating aspects of the will to union theory
and the punishment theory, Louisiana courts will have to develop their
own standard over time. However, with the illustrative list provided,
courts would at least have some basis from which to compare conduct.
283. Henderson, supm note 17, at 57.
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Although this does leave much discretion with the courts, the
discretion is exercised in determining when the legal community
regime terminates-not in determining how much of the putative
community property the legal spouse is to receive-and does not run
afoul of the notion that a good faith putative spouse receives all the
civil effects of her putative marriage.
Another potential setback is posed by the heightened fact-finding
procedures necessary to determine when each spouse shows sufficient
objective conduct that he or she has lost the will to union. However,
such intensive fact-finding should not deter the judiciary. Courts often
look to meticulous distinctions within community property law to
determine issues concerning classification and management. Further,
the courts already look to objective evidence to determine the
subjective good or bad faith of the common spouse in the context of
determining his entitlement to putative community property.284 This
solution requires a similar inquiry-whether the objective evidence
shows that a spouse has lost the will to the union-for both the
common spouse and the legal spouse, instead of just the common
spouse.
Arguably, the temporal factor inherent in some instances may
prove to have unduly burdensome effects on meeting the evidentiary
standard. The legal marriage could last for a very long time, thirty
years for example, and it may be more difficult to prove sufficient
conduct as demonstrated by objective evidence. Because this solution
requires evidence of an objective manifestation of loss of will to union,
this could prove challenging to show thirty years down the road when
the court would actually be making the inquiry. However, even though
the spouses may not have any evidence regarding the first time that a
particular spouse objectively demonstrated his or her loss of the will to
union, the spouses will surely find one piece of objective evidence not
too far chronologically removed. This could include the testimony of a
witness that the legal spouse exhibited some conduct rising to the level
of the conduct on the illustrative list, a subsequent remarriage by the
legal spouse, or a change in the beneficiary to her will or to life
insurance proceeds, for example. This date may not be exact, but it is
the best that the courts can do in any situation when an objective
manifestation of subjective intent is required. For example, in Fong,
Ngan may have lost her will to union when she first heard that Alfonso
had remarried, but the only objective evidence that the court had of her
284. SeeLA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 96, cmt. d (2010).
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loss occurred when she held herself out to be her own sister when
Alfonso visited China.285 If the parties had presented objective
evidence dating prior to the date of her disguised meeting with
Alfonso, then the court could have considered that evidence in making
its determination. Even though the dates may not be exact, it will be
up to the parties to engage in sufficient discovery so that the court can
align the subjective loss with the date of the objective manifestation as
closely as possible.
Finally, courts need to ensure that the adoption of this solution
would be limited only to the putative marriage context under article
96-when the putative spouse is in good faith. Although California,
Washington, and Arizona apply the doctrine in the general marriage
context,28 Louisiana should only use the doctrine in the putative
marriage context that arises under article 96.287
VII. CONCLUSION
The earliest formulations of Louisiana's putative marriage rule
sought to protect the rights of the good faith putative spouse."' If the
putative spouse contracted the marriage in good faith, then the good
faith putative spouse was entitled to the civil effects of her marriage-
most importantly, the putative spouse received community property
rights.28 9 But as the law was silent as to how to apportion the putative
community property, the Louisiana Supreme Court fashioned two sets
of rules in Patton and Pnnce, depending on whether the common
spouse was in good or bad faith.2 0 The court looked to Spanish law
when the common spouse was in bad faith and to French law when the
common spouse was in good faith, adopting into its jurisprudence
certain policies inapposite to those embodied in the current language
of article 96.291 As these two cases, decided over 160 and 50 years ago,
285. 589 P2d 1330, 1336 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1978).
286. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 771 (West 2010); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 26.16.140
(West 2010); see also Pendleton v. Brown, 221 P. 213, 215 (Ariz. 1923).
287. This Article does not purport to suggest a solution for the problem of
apportioning putative community property under article 96 when the common spouse is in
good faith and the putative spouse is in bad faith. However, because either the common
spouse or the putative spouse must be in good faith in order for the article 96 exception to
absolutely null marriages to apply at all, the author cannot think of a scenario in which the
common spouse would be in good faith but the putative spouse not in good faith.
288. SeeLA. CIV. CODE ANN. arts. 119-120 (1825).
289. Seeid. art. 119.
290. Patton v. Cities of Philadelphia & New Orleans, 1 La. Ann. 98 (1846); Prince v.
Hobson, 89 So. 2d 128 (La. 1956).
291. Patton, 1 La.Ann.at 104;Prnce,89So.2dat 133.
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respectively, still control the putative community property issue,
Louisiana should reconsider its continued application of these
inequitable apportionment rules because they fail to protect the rights
of the good faith putative spouse.292
Instead of the putative divorce solution proposed by some
scholars, Louisiana should look to the common law doctrine of living
separate and apart as recognized in California, Washington, and
Arizona.293 Although each state applies a different interpretation of the
doctrine, the underlying rationale is that spouses can, by their conduct,
show that they are physically and emotionally living separate and apart
such that they effectively end the community property regime between
them.294 Any property acquired by the spouses while they are deemed
to be living separate and apart is each spouse's separate property.295
Louisiana should adopt a tailored form of this doctrine within the
context of good faith putative marriage under article 96. The legal
community would terminate when both spouses exhibit objective
evidence that they have lost the will to union.296 Once that date is set,
depending on the faith status of the common spouse and other factual
circumstances, the legal community would end, and the legal spouse
would only be entitled to a one-half interest in that legal community.
In no instance would the legal spouse's right impinge upon the good
faith putative spouse's interest in the putative community property.297
Thus, in all cases, the good faith putative spouse receives the entire
one-half interest in her putative community property just as if her
marriage were legally valid, keeping in line with article 96's
proscription that the good faith putative spouse receives all of the civil
effects of marriage.
When spouses enter into a contract of marriage in good faith,
they expect certain legal benefits to flow from that juridical act. Such
expectations should not be undermined when the other party to the
marriage contract happens to be married already to someone else. The
law should adopt an apportionment rule in the putative marriage
scenario that more closely aligns with the expectations of the good
faith parties involved. As Louisiana law seems to favor the marital
institution, the putative marriage rules should do more to protect fully
292. Supra Part H.
293. CAL. Fw. CODE § 771 (West 2010); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 26.16.140 (West
2010); Pendleton v. Brown, 221 P. 213 (Ariz. 1923).
294. See generaIlyREPPY & SAMUEL, supra note 20, at 140-52.
295. Id
296. See discussion supra Part V
297. Seediscussion supra Part VI.A.
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the rights of innocent putative spouses who enter into marriage
contracts in good faith.
